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
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POLITICS**TRENDS****V.Kulistikov**KREMLIN PEACEMAKING: NOT FOR PEACE,
BUT FOR THE SAKE OF THE EMPIRE 3**COVER STORY**THE MILITARY VS. DIPLOMATS: THE FORMER ARE
LEADING SO FAR 4**P.Gutiontov**

GENERAL LEBED VS. GOATS AND CARROTS 5

6

KARABAKH**A.Iskandarian**

THE HOSTAGES OF THE CONFLICT 6

OBSERVER'S VIEW**D.Volsky**

PREPARED TO COVER ITS HALF OF THE PATH 10

OPINION**L.Goldin**

THE HARD ROAD TO A COMMON HOME 11

11



Cover photo by ITAR-TASS

ECONOMICS**GUEST COLUMN****G.Sorman**

WHY THE WEST IS NOT AIDING RUSSIA 14

DOSSIER


PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING LAND TAX RATES

ON THE BASIS OF NORMATIVE PRICE OF LAND 15

PRIVATIZATION**V.Isakov, P.Filippov**FROM THE COMMONLY OWNED
TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 19**INTERNATIONAL****DESTINIES****A.Chudodeyev**

ORDEALS OF A NORTH KOREAN FUGITIVE 23

23

**CRIME****M.Levin**

THEY DON'T STEAL IN KUOPIO 26

FEMALE LOGIC**T.Ivanova**

THE YOUNG LADY AND THE NOVELIST 27

ARCHIVES**A.Chereshnya**

WHO WILL BREAK THE SEVENTH SEAL? 30

MUSIC**A.Pin**

NEW STARS IN MUSICAL FIRMAMENT 32

**LETTERS (2), THIS WEEK (8), OUTLOOK (22),
PEOPLE (28)**

The hushed up became known

I was amazed with what I had seen in the Library of Congress, where an exhibit of documents is on display from the Russian Archives, all relating to the Soviet epoch. Shocking are not only the dirty secrets, which are to be found in the archives, but also the cool businesslike tone in which all 500 documents are written. From them we are able to uncover the secret history of a large part of the 20th century. But only part of it can truly be called secret, many displays in the exhibit only serve to confirm that, about which was already suspected long ago by those who christened communists "anti-Soviets." In this sense it is correct really to talk about substantiations rather than actual disclosures. These documents tell our citizens that everything took place just as the whole world had expected ages ago, and that there are reasons for everything. It's as if, unexpectedly, a blackstar had been opened, which in the course of tens of years, in some incomprehensible way, influenced the movement of the planet.

Sibil Rite,
student
Washington

Opening a new page...

It is necessary to give praise where praise is due - the Russian intelligentsia has come out the victor in its battle with totalitarianism, that end result of the Communist system. They dealt the final blow to old-style international relations which were based on the cold war and distrust between peoples. Unfortunately, in Russia they still perceive the notion that there exist "special Soviet - Indian relations", a hold over from the past, like a relic of totalitarianism, and they are all ready to send these "special relations" trailing Communism

to the garbage dump of history. In my view, the people at the helm of your international policy making are allowing a grave error to be made. One mustn't lump India into the same bag as Communist Cuba or Vietnam. It was never a satellite of the USSR. It would be good if Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs understood: India in its politics was, is and will be absolutely independent. However paradoxical it may seem, the "special relations" between India and the former USSR interfered with the Russian intelligentsia learning, in full, about our multifarious social movements, whether it be environmental protection, human rights, or feminism, or about the experience of our mixed economy, about our democratic political system and about many other issues as well. Currently when the veil of pseudo-friendship has fallen to the wayside, there is a need for us to face one another and to open a new page in the history of our relations.

Sandjay Aggraval,
businessman
State of Kharean, India

Well of wisdom

I read "Manuscripts" with keen interest and compile them. Though written decades ago, they remain topical even today. I have only now come to understand that the treasury of Russian political, philosophical and ethical thought is truly inexhaustible. One can find in it answers to many "damned questions" which worry the current generations in the West, particularly the youth. It's great pity that these writings are still unknown or little known in the West, even among specialists. After the removal of the "iron curtain," the world is only beginning to gain access to the well of Russian wisdom. Many more discoveries await us.

Daniel Frank,
student
Lausanne, Switzerland

THE WAY I SEE IT



Drawing by S. Fedko

Trust is also capital

In spite of the immense debt we have inherited from the Soviet Union, it would be shortsighted for us Finnish businessmen to wind up our economic ties with Russia. On the contrary, we must continue our trade with the East. Otherwise other Western countries will surpass us, and it will be very difficult to make up for the time lost. Though the volume of our trade has fallen, the Russian business would still regard Finland as a reliable partner. This trust will prove very useful to us when Russia overcomes its present difficulties.

Toivo Ahtola,
businessman
Turku

Women, a pillar of democracy

It is my profound belief that

democracy will really work in Russia only when its women acquire a worthy place in society. So far the position of women in your country leaves much to be desired. Incidentally, the magazine carried a good article on this problem by Larisa Lisytukina (No. 24/92). In civilized countries, women constitute up to 40 percent of MPs. As far as I know, there is only five percent of women MPs in your country. The defence minister of Finland, the foreign minister of Sweden and the prime minister of Norway are all women. For many years the prime minister of Britain was a woman, and a woman now heads the British intelligence service. For you such a possibility is only a far off dream so far.

Silvia Wolf,
teacher
Aukland

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TRENDS

Kremlin peacemaking: not for peace, but for the sake of the Empire

It looks as if the ecstasy for innovation in the sphere of foreign policy which was domestic matters in Gorbachev's time, has finally abandoned the Kremlin. The project, which provided for a better life for Russia within its 16th century confines, no longer plays the leading role in the construing of diplomatic policy in the "not-too-distant abroad." Isolationism has failed and not only because, unlike in the case of Great Britain, there is no salutary ocean between the territory of the Russian main nation and its former dependencies. The problem of state borders is important, but it's not this that urges the Kremlin to make its case against Kiev, Kisineu, Tbilisi and other places, where life is much less comfortable than in Washington or Rome. About thirty million Russians outside Russia who are potential, and in some instances actual, victims of discrimination, the remnants of a once great Soviet Army from the Baltic Sea to the Afghan border, hastily taken under the Russian jurisdiction, and, in the parlance current in the still earlier, tsarist, Russia, imperially-minded non-Russians who, lobbying in Moscow, prompt to local leaders all sorts of bold ideas concerning restoration of the lost imperial grandeur, don't allow the Kremlin leaders to forget about the lost empire.

The promptings find a more than merely fertile soil. In a recent interview to the Russian TV Boris Yeltsin bitterly complained of the disintegration of the USSR and blamed this crime on those who in any case would be held liable for everything, i.e., the putschists kept in custody. One of them, the former chief of the KGB Vladimir Kryuchkov, having mobilized all his extraordinary talent as an analyst, tried to prove on the pages of the newspaper *Pravda* that precisely the Russian President brought about the fall of the Empire. This, to my mind, was wrong. Boris Yeltsin is not a leader who can reject real power for the sake of an abstract idea. He was forced to abolish the USSR by the impossibility of controlling the enormous country the way it had been done before. The palliative to the USSR, the Commonwealth of Independent States, failed to help the situation. Thus far there are no pawns in independent republics who would, using the new rhetoric, sacrifice themselves for the sake of the old imperial machinery. The Kremlin's task, while being unable to accommodate refugees, pull out troops in the foreseeable future or do away with non-Russian lobbies, has been re-sculpted by life itself: Russia will have to create anew her sphere of influence in places where her plenipotentiary power has been only recently questioned by no one. And the new system of mutual relations is immeasurably more complicated than the old imperial one, which, in spite of the Machiavellian intrigues and confusion of the Leninist-

Stalinist ethnic policy, created undecipherable hierarchic structures of state arrangement, from national districts parodying the Red Indian reservations to "Union republics" parodying sovereign states of the Confederation times.

The Kremlin has tried all sorts of methods to influence its naughty partners within a short time. For instance, it tried to speak the language of strength with Ukraine, having put forward territorial claims to it as early as a week after the suppression of the August putsch. All republics without exception have experienced the burden of economic isolation from Russia. However, neither the former nor the latter could produce effective results. Russia has no real internal political ability to resort to "the last argument of kings," because of the problematic situation of the Russian Armed Forces. Besides, this kind of grand manoeuvring wouldn't be understood on the international arena. As for economic pressure, Russia is far too poor and unruly — any ban is circumvented to the benefit of bureaucracy and profiteers.

And thus, in the name of peace in Georgia and Moldova, a new scenario of restituting Russia's rights of at least a supreme arbitrator or, more precisely, a gendarme, is being tested. The Kremlin uses three kinds of camouflage for its imperial policy. I would call the first "a partial restoration of the Soviet model," i.e., when a conflict is suppressed by a multilateral force made up of the USSR's former subjects. An attempt of that kind is made in South Ossetia. A "narrow international scenario" may be staged in Moldova which provides for appeasing the conflicting sides not only by former partners in the USSR, but also by foreign neighbours, Romania and Bulgaria. And, lastly, a broad international scenario is being prepared for Karabakh in whose tragedy all CSCE members are already involved.

Participation of Russian Forces in the appeasement is the common feature of all three scenarios. Take the case of Georgia. Russian profiles, units of a paratrooper battalion, take part in the peacemaking action along with Ossetian volunteers and Georgian police-like detachments. They will bear the major burden of responsibility, and those who have sent them mainly influence the course of operation. It's precisely from them that the forces in Georgia, whom the action will bring political dividends to, will seek support, and this is a direct path to dependence, a relationship which is the basis for any sphere of influence.

Vladimir Kulistikov





Diplomat
Andrei Kozyrev

The military versus diplomats: the former are leading so far



General Alexander
Lebed

A highlight of the past week was a statement by General Alexander Lebed, the new commander of the 14th Army stationed on the banks of the Dniester, made about the Kishinev leadership and the Moldovan army.

"Let me reject outright the likely accusations that I, a soldier, interfere in politics," the General snapped off at the beginning of his press conference. "I deny these charges, and I am telling you that my position is that of a Russian officer who has a conscience."

The General painted a shuddering picture indeed of the situation in Bendery, a prosperous city until recently, now looted and lying in ruins. One can understand his professed determination to do everything within his powers to prevent further escalation of violence and vandalism, which can only push Moldova into the abyss of a civil war.

By denying the charge of interference in politics he clearly implied that he regarded such interference as not befitting a military man. Actually, he contradicts himself and presents an ultimatum to his government and to his commander-in-chief. General Lebed's reaction to the moves made by the head of the Russian state towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict looks far from proper: "It's time the government stopped wallowing in the morass of its vague and amorphous policy." The General's attitude to President Mircea Snegur of Moldova and his entourage is strictly negative. "I can no longer regard Snegur, who has been legally — legally, I repeat, — elected President of Moldova as a President... Instead of carrying out his functions as the state leader, he organized a fascist state, and his clique is a fascist one."

Here is the General's idea of a peaceful settlement: "Every measure should be taken so that the fascists be put in the pillory, where they belong."

The General's "black-and-white" vision of the situation in the Dniester Region is amazing. In his words, "There is neither a post-Communist, nor a neo-Communist, nor any other regime." In what was a public demonstration of his political outlook and his view of the situation in Russia, General Lebed announced, with a soldierly straightforwardness: "As to the power I have the honour to represent here, I may comment that we had better stop going around the world asking for alms. We are not goats begging for carrots. It's about time we stopped doing this, and got down to work.

We've got to keep the prestige of our power high. If we roll our sleeves up, they will come borrowing from us yet."

The reaction to the General's statement was not long in coming. Comments started pouring in from all quarters, negative ones for the most part. It was only diplomats who kept mum.

It looks as if talkative generals and taciturn diplomats are becoming part of our political tradition.

It is not up to the military to air their views on the political leadership of the republic, of the foreign state, they happen to serve in. This is only too obvious, and therefore one cannot help suspecting that Lebed's behaviour has the tacit approval of Russia's echelons of power. After all, no one — not even Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, the General's immediate superior — has called him to order. Incidentally, shortly upon assuming office, the Minister had expressed himself along similar lines to Alexander Lebed, and is not likely to change his mind. But why, then, doesn't the President step in?

A soldier cannot possibly be neutral when he is being shot at, amid exploding shells, with mutilated corpses of civilians catching his eye whichever way he looks. Politicians ought not put their specific mentality to such an acid test. But they are only expressing their indignation over soldiers' words.

The General is wrong, of course. One gets the impression that generals are trying to do the job normally reserved for diplomats. Why have the latter allowed the former to poach on their ground, and confined themselves to a statement to the effect that Lebed's appointment had not been agreed with by the Foreign Ministry? In the meantime, the General assumed the Foreign Ministry's functions by bringing to the notice of the world public Russia's protest over the killing of civilians in Bendery. If we are to use political method rather than force in the Dniester Region, we should begin with organizing international pressure on Moldova. The storming of Bendery left hundreds dead and still more wounded, which was left practically unnoticed and brought no protest from the world community, let alone from Russia's own political organizations; as the assassination of 32 bus passengers in South Ossetia, near the village of Kekhvi, also seemed to go unnoticed.

Generals should be ordered to observe neutral-

ity, of course, but, at the same time, not tempted by a chance to display their combat skill. In other words, the situation in the Dniester Region and in South Ossetia ought to be continuously monitored by representatives of Russia's Foreign Ministry, and the higher their rank is, the better. Does Russia have any foreign policy problems more urgent than those of stopping bloodshed in neighbouring countries and preventing the Russian army from intervening in those countries' internal affairs?

What makes the situation still more curious is that at the same time Boris Yeltsin is having negotiations with Mircea Snegur and talking about mutual understanding. It's great that negotiations with Snegur have been organized, and it will be greater still if anything good comes of them. So far, however, there is no stopping the bloodshed.

Foreign policy matters are commented upon by anyone who takes the trouble, although it is the role of professionals to do so. All these comments — whether they come from generals or from "patriotic" MPs — inevitably suffer from a primitive understanding and faith in simple solutions where no simple solutions are possible. Russia lacks a coordinated foreign policy. It looks as if such a state of affairs is maintained intentionally. Is that what Andrei Kozyrev hinted at in his warning against dictatorship? Was he trying to imply that he was not in control of the situation?

Over the past few days the President has made a number of new appointments which gave rise to speculations that the 40th ("Afghan") Army is taking over control of the armed forces. General Boris Gromov has found himself among the top Defence Ministry executives. Alexander Lebed was sent to a hot spot which the country's internal political stability largely depends on. The two belong to a new generation of generals — young, self-confident, determined and knowing from their own practical experience what war is. Without batting an eyelid, they are extending their strong-arm methods to other spheres of state policy. If diplomats do not forestall generals, then reaction in Russia may indeed begin from the foreign policy sphere. It is also over just such an issue that civil war could break out.

One cannot help wondering who gives generals the go-ahead to make such aggressive statements which have the potential to strain relations between the republics to the breaking point.



General Lebed vs. goats and carrots

Quite plainly nobody is ever happy with the journalist. For whatever he might show on the screen or write in the paper, there is sure to be somebody who'll shout into his face that it's slander, a provocation, an outright lie.

There are of course, unfortunately, cases that cannot be disputed. There is more than enough of wilful falsehood, blunt baseness and rudimentary irresponsibility, and, let me add, the staggering condescension with which the powers-that-are, who want to be seen as "strong," react.

Take that restless Parisian Eduard Limonov, who in the newspaper *Den* (The Day) contributed an essay eloquently entitled "The Stormtroops of the Working Masses."

While the Russian Parliament refuses to consider the fascist danger, Limonov and ilk recruit to these "stormtroops" the "grim-faced legionaries of coming rebellions," the Anpilovs mount initial assaults, and the Makashovs inspect frontline trenches. They all cry for live screentime for what they term "an hour of truth," and seek to wreck the so-called "information blockade."

What on earth for though?

Now and again it seems to me that everything those sundry "our guys" seek to say has long been uttered by hated democrats who borrow from opponents slogans, which had curdled their blood but 12-18 months earlier. Indeed, why should incoherent Anpilov with his ramblings seek the TV screen when battle scarred General Lebed bluntly notes from the screen that "To go beginning around the world like a goat after a carrot has got to stop. We've got a job to do!" Which will be brought home to every billy goat. What sort of "job" does the general have in mind? Amazingly enough, the threats he has enunciated, have still not been commented upon, even officially.

Incidentally, a few words about the objectivity with which our mass media cover conflicts, that may embroil more and more deeply Russia and her stalwart generals, who, incidentally, take too much liberties (one might recall that unlike Lebed the American Hussein-trouncing general Schwarzkopf was sacked for much less unhappy pronouncement).

Russia, as the great power she is, must definitely see to it that the big guns her plants cast not shell residential quarters. Yet when calls come from the state-owned TV that there be sent to Bendery, to wit in a sovereign state, Russian volunteers for protecting compatriots, would not it be far better to invoke international law first?

What generally scares me is the irrevocable way in which each attempt to negotiate is spiked by an "unsanctioned" resumption of fire by either side, as a result of which I long concluded that actually the extreme radical "national thinking" men on either side comprise but one party even though its programme may target directly opposed objectives, from reunification with Romania to reunification with Russia. In truth, the adepts on both sides think alike and subscribe to a common ideology and common political expanse. Why? Because both may keep afloat only in a "besieged camp," only if opposed to a perfidious enemy, only

Heard increasingly louder in the patriotic "they're beating up our guys!" chorus are voices of men we've been used to thinking were democrats

to the strains of air alerts. Actually they besmirch the very concept of patriotism.

The more immoral therefore for us, hundreds of miles away from the frontlines, is it to mourn the death of only "our own" boys and pretend to forget that in a civil war the blood shed by boys of every nationality is of an identical hue.

Blood is being spilled in Moldova. Blood is being spilled in Karabakh. Blood is being spilled in Ossetia. That is more than the breakup of a "great power." That spells death. Yet colleagues from the Transcaucasus offer me a booklet describing the atrocities perpetrated by neighbours with whom but recently

they had sat at one table. "Only last year so many people were killed in Nagorny Karabakh." There follow statistics, from which it is plainly deduced that the authors of the booklet consider only people of their own nationality "human beings."

Nevzorov's hysterical screech "Our guys are being beaten up!" rings over more loudly throughout the expanses of Russia. There are of course people who very much hanker to have these "our guys" beaten more and more badly. Their attitudes are plain and outspoken. What is far more dangerous is that joining this patriotic chorus, at first rather awkwardly but then more and more naturally, are people whom we have been used to thinking were democrats.

Generally speaking, it is coming increasingly home to me that of all advocates of democracy still around in the "ruble expanse," it is foreign policy chiefs who have a better notion than all else of what is taking place in the country. Recall for instance, the warning that Eduard Shevardnadze issued at the Fourth Congress before tendering his resignation, when he said: "The democrats have scattered, the reformers have retreated and a dictatorship is coming." I for one still remember the long chat I had with him in July 1991, when he, then an ex-minister, said tiredly: "It has got to be understood at last that the threat I mentioned in December is not only still there but is perhaps even growing... We must build up guarantees against a swingback and only afterwards settle our own matters."

To this day we still have not built up those guarantees. Meanwhile the democrats continue to absorbedly settle accounts among themselves.

Recently I attended a Russia-US conference on the freedom of the press and the conditions needed to ensure that. I remember the speech of Gilbert Merrit, Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals. He said he was convinced that if the First Amendment were put to a plebiscite nowadays the Americans would blackball a free press. "The foes of freedom may wake up," he warned.

Though we are grateful for his warning, let me note that in this country the foes of freedom have not even gone to bed yet.

Pavel Gutontov





The hostages of the conflict

The war in Karabakh has entered a new phase with more sophisticated weaponry being employed. *Cui bono?*

In the light of recent developments in the Dniester area and Ossetia the Armenian-Azerbaijani war is overshadowed in wire services reports. Yet in the past two months, changes have occurred that in the final analysis have altered the course of the war in Karabakh. Implied are the Armenian seizures of the Azerbaijan cities of Shusha and Lachin, the new regime in Azerbaijan and the ensuing broad offensive in Karabakh.

It had to happen

Curiously enough all these events were forecasted, even intensively anticipated by either side. By taking Shusha and subsequently Lachin the Armenians sought to resolve the problem of Karabakh by armed force. Indeed for Karabakh that was all that could be done. Shusha was Azerbaijan's outpost

in the heart of Karabakh, a citadel overlooking Stepanakert that was much easier to hold than to take. Its capture deprived the Azerbaijanian army of its point of vantage for bombarding Stepanakert. Meanwhile, the Lachin corridor linking Armenia and Karabakh was for the latter a lifeline for supplying food and guns. Now the theatre of hostilities had shifted to Karabakh's boundaries, where action on either side was none too successful. It was thought that for a while trench warfare would continue.

This situation continued for a whole month until the long expected electoral victory in Azerbaijan of its Popular Front. Armenian victories in the field signally contributed to the collapse in Azerbaijan of the communist regime, even though by that time it formally was no longer communist. With the war looming high politically in both

republics, the inability of the authorities to retain strategic key points was most advantageous for the opposition in Azerbaijan.

Finally, the third episode in the chain, which again came as an obvious development for all students of the Karabakh conflict. I mean the mounting of a new Azerbaijanian offensive against Karabakh, which for President Elchibei was a forced measure, as corresponding in principle to electoral anticipations and doubly so to his hustings. However there ensued what nobody had expected with the offensive mounted proving to be far more effective than had been initially predicted. Had its scale corresponded to expectations, it would have been as useless as all earlier 30-odd bloody abortive actions of that nature. Indeed, after the seizure of Shusha and Lachin the local alignment was such that the Azerbaijanian army would have not been able to attack Karabakh from any quarter, as territorially it had linked up with Armenia. Shusha's seizure shored up Ar-

menia's military advantage. However Azerbaijan could not put off the new offensive, as according to expert assessment, in but three or four months after lifting the blockade Nagorny Karabakh would have become invulnerable, to all practical intents.

Slav mercenaries

At 6 p.m. on June 12 the Azerbaijan army mounted from Azerbaijan a frontal offensive along the entire length of Nagorny Karabakh's northern and eastern boundaries. Involved were upwards of 150 armoured vehicles, primarily tanks, plus several thousand infantry. Two SU-25 assault planes, one of which was subsequently shot down, bombed Karabakh. By now Karabakh's northernmost Shaumian District and part of the adjacent Mardakert District have been occupied, while on the eastern front five villages have been taken in the Askeran District. Casualties run into thousands according to the Karabakh wire service; more specifically, nobody knows what has befallen some 3,000 of the 20,000 inhabitants of northern Karabakh made homeless. Among the refugees are some 3,000 Russians from the villages of Leonarkh and Russkiye Borisy.

Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian associates the latest developments with the violated local military alignment due to the transfer to Azerbaijan of weaponry and munitions by former Soviet armed forces. According to the Armenian Defence Ministry, prior to June 12, Azerbaijan received a total of 150 tanks, 120 armoured cars, 170 armoured personnel carriers, some 150 mortars, and 90 ack-ack units. Likewise to be transferred are 20 MIG-25 fighters and several score SU-25 assault planes.

The CIS High Command has not denied this emphasizing that the transfer is lawful under reciprocal accords apportioning the properties of the former Soviet army. Generally, that is true and in effect the upset alignment is due not to the circumstance that Azerbaijan is getting weaponry but to the fact that such weaponry is not transferred under the aforementioned accords simultaneously to Armenia or is delivered but slowly, the Armenians say. All one can say is that it would have been better not to have transferred such powerful weaponry in such quantities at all to the theatre of hostilities.

Karabakh and Armenian authorities have noted time and again that involved in the fighting on the Azerbaijanian side are servicemen of the Rus-

sian army's 23rd and 295th divisions, namely those divisions whose weaponry and munitions are being transferred to Azerbaijan. However, the CIS High Command denies this, noting that the Slavs in the Azerbaijanian army are Azerbaijanian citizens of the respective nationality, or possibly mercenaries, ex-servicemen, but not men on active service. Which is all very hard to check and strictly speaking it is not that important.

What is important is why and who wanted the military alignment to be violated, since it is absolutely obvious that in wartime either side would be only too willing to accept aid on such a scale from anyone. The Azerbaijanians offer no comment. One can hardly believe the CIS High Command did not envisage that the unsynchronized transfer of weaponry to the belligerents would spur hostilities. Only Armenia has sought to explain, and there follows its version insofar which is curious and rather demonstrative.

Anti-Armenian "Entente"?

Armenians are convinced that the USA, Turkey and Russia have reached an agreement, in which connection they mention Turkish Prime Minister Demirel's Moscow visit. Its alleged purpose is a "Megri corridor," which, analogous to the Lachin corridor, would link Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan and, correspondingly, with Turkey, as only Nakhichevan has a common frontier with that country. At the same time Armenia would be cut off from Iran. A host of excuses could be trotted out to support this conjecture, for instance, the troop concentrations the Armenian media report on the border of Armenia's Megri District, totalling ten motorized infantry battalions from Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan.

Turkey will find such a corridor advantageous as linking it up with Central Asia in circumvention of Iran and Armenia. President Elchibei's definitely pro-Turkish and anti-Iranian pronouncements likewise favour this version. Further, a bridge is currently being thrown up across the Megri to link Armenia with Iran and thus break through the blockade. Finally, US support for Turkey as a NATO member and the region's only pro-Western state, as well as its anti-Iranian policy are common knowledge. However, the said version does not appear convincing even for the simple reason that to establish the so-called corridor it would be necessary to occupy Megri not Northern Karabakh.

Further, the Megri District is a well fortified highland area where it would be virtually impossible to employ armour as has been so successfully done in the plainlands of Northern Karabakh. Even should the seizure of Northern Karabakh be part of this plan, one will be baffled why fighting continues so long the more so as all positions were captured in the first two days, though Megri is supposedly the basic target. Finally, one will absolutely fail to realize what Russia could gain.

Winless War

I believe the problem should be approached from another side. As I see it, the manner in which the fighting proceeds in Karabakh over recent weeks and where, imply much more than political constructions. Though the battles are weakening Karabakh, they have not led to a full and final victory in the field for Azerbaijan. What remains of the Mardakert and Shaumian districts hitherto populated mostly by Armenian farmers is nothing but scorched earth and the experience thus far gained in Nagorny Karabakh shows that the inhabitants usually never return to villages wiped off the face of the earth. On the other hand, it is impossible to take Karabakh from the north, as to do that troops must attack Shusha, Lachin and march via Askeran on Stepanakert. This, however, is not being done. The sole purpose is most likely to continue the war. This is the first time a development of this nature has eventuated since the capture of Shusha and Lachin and it is also for the first time in the conflict that armour is involved to an extent comparable to World War II. After all the Armenians will also get the weaponry due them, which means there will be no end to the war.

Armenia's government is under heavy pressure from a united political opposition: no wonder the leaders of the two belligerents are seen as hostages to the Karabakh conflict. The main thing though is that both sides feel they will not be able to resolve the problem by armed force by themselves and that any party desirous of exerting influence in the area may easily do so by militarily backing either side, but at the same time letting neither win.

Hence, the question of the never ending war in Karabakh remains open. *Cui bono?*

Alexander Iskandarian

Photo by Gleb Garanich

Boris Yeltsin's globetrotting continues, this week taking in Munich and Helsinki. Russia expectedly loomed high at the Munich B7 Summit. Adopted was a 10-point "aid for self-aid" programme setting out policies vis-à-vis Russia, notably financial aid under accords with IMF, deferment of debt payment, honouring of Western export loan promises, all-inclusive assistance for the transition to a market-free economy, backing for private investment in oil and gas, easier Russian export to B7 countries, cooperation in defence industry conversion, etc. Important now is to flesh this programme so that it not remain



a sonorous declaration, was the basic point President Yeltsin stressed at his news conference after the "round table consultations" with him ended. Yeltsin has additionally received a guaranteed \$1 billion out of IMF's promised \$24 billion and firm promises of some \$3 billion more.

A definite landmark in the Helsinki process was the latest CSCE summit attended among others by Russia's President and Foreign Minister, and deputations from several CIS states. Indeed, after CSCE's prevalent exchange of speculation as to Europe's problems, a new phase has dawned with the emphasis on a stronger machinery for guaranteeing security and cooperation on the continent. This firstly implies an enhanced role for the CSCE Council as the paramount executive body, to which end the office of a standing chairman has been instituted. Special heed was paid to resolving national conflicts. It was decided to form at short order a CSCE peace-keeping force. For the first time in CSCE history a decision was taken to send military observers to conflict-stricken areas in the former USSR. While the summit was in progress, Yeltsin met Shevardnadze and Walesa. After it ended, Yeltsin paid a brief official visit to Finland before returning home.

At a Forum of supporters of reform, held at the Russian parliamentary centre, representatives of 40 political parties, public organizations, parliamentary factions and key cabinet members adopted an agreement open to other parties, which may evidently turn the

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tide in the democratic movement and initiate a powerful bloc backing reform and the government. The meeting's sponsors regard the basic task as that of backing changes which "could turn our society as soon as possible into one of private owners and economically free citizens" and thus deprive the "patriotic communist bloc" of a social basis. Demanded was a judicial ban on all organizations fomenting class, ethnic and religious strife or preaching violence. A war has been declared against totalitarian communist and pro-fascist trends and the corporative association of industrial Soviet and collective farm lobbies seeking to preserve their monopoly.

Hearings in the "CPSU case" have resumed in the Russian Constitutional Court. Though former CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev refused to attend, the Court found that this would not obstruct a full examination of the case. The appeal introduced by the spokesman for a group of People's Deputies to summon Boris Yeltsin as "witness" or "author of the decrees" banning the CPSU and the Russian Communist Party was re-



jected. Though both sides say they are categorically against turning the hearings into a political trial, few doubt that a political colouring will be inevitably imparted even contrary to the wishes of the parties involved. Though the hearings may drag on, they will produce more than one bombshell.

Estonia is pushing independence with a gusto. After introducing the Estonian crown as its national currency, it has now enforced austere entry rules. We could wish it well were it not for the following two points. Of late Estonian quasi-military formations have increasingly

WEEK

attacked Russian servicemen stationed in that country. Also resident "non-Estonians" were barred to a recent plebiscite on the draft of the republic's new constitution; as they comprise half the potential electorate this development, observers think, may complicate relations between Estonians and Russophones, and thus destabilize the situation.

Supporters of the Federal Centre for a Land and Agrarian Reform which Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi has set up as a state body under him, believe it will turn the tide in the current agrarian situation and spur profound changes. However, Rutskoi's opponents maintain that this new creation will only be a supermonster compared to which the sadly notorious Gosagroprom (the state agrarian and industrial department) is peanuts. While the wrangle over the new agency continues in the top echelon urban residents as well as servicemen have been mobilized to bring in the harvest, as used to be done before.

An overall ceasefire in Moldova is now in force, with weaponry drawn back from the theatre of hostilities on both sides. This was implemented under accords reached earlier in the Limanskoye village between representatives of the High Commands of the Russian and Moldovan defence ministries, and the commanding officer of the Dniester guards. The ceasefire has also muted 14th army CO Maj. General Lebed. True, the Russian Parliament has sanctioned employment of his army as a peace-keeping force. Hopefully peace will return to Moldova's cities and countryside.



Rumours that CIS was heading towards its demise, so intensively bruited about after the Tashkent meet, have been capsized at the latest Moscow meeting of the Council of CIS heads of state. Though only six hours long, it was highly productive examining all 15 points on the agenda and confirming three documents defining commitments and the procedure for implementing treaties inherited from the USSR and the apportionment of the property, assets and debts of the former USSR. A package of accords on military matters including renunciation of nuclear weapons by Belarus, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan was signed. Agreement was reached to institute a CIS Economic Court patterned on the International Court of Justice at The Hague and also an advisory Coordinating Economic Council.



Because of his heavy work load President Yeltsin has little time for systematic medical check-ups. Indeed he had his last all-round check-up five years ago. However, since his physical and psychological stresses and tremendous work load make health checks vital, his doctor Grigoriev called for an all-round examination. The leading Russian doctors involved say that healthwise Boris Yeltsin is okay.

Anatoly Chubais, Chairman of Goskomimushchestvo, the Russian State Committee for the Management of Property, blasted all hopes that real estate owned before 1917 would be returned when he said the government did not envisage that.

The newly opened magic and witchcraft courses in the Siberian city of Tyumen claimed that for 350-rouble fee anyone can be taught six lessons to "remote-control people," detect hidden treasure, and learn sundry incantations and spells. Special certificates will be issued to the 100 or so who have already joined.

Prepared to cover its half of the path

One would think it is useless to ask who won the cold war. The winner is certainly the free world, and President Bush in particular stresses the point on every occasion. The matter is not so simple, however. There is another phenomenon which is also evident. Without a broad growth of the democratic movement in the former USSR, first of all in Russia, communist totalitarianism would not have been crushed and the cold war would be continuing into the present. It would be more appropriate therefore to talk about victory not in the cold war but over it. It is this common victory which — to no less extent than their own revolutions — opened the way to the independence of the former Soviet republics. However, some republics are already inclined to forget this fact.



There are those trying to draw a dividing line between "victors" and the "vanquished" near Belgorod and Bryansk (cities close to the border with Ukraine). The Hamburg newspaper *Die Zeit* noted ironically that the patriots of newly proclaimed states suffer from the complex of "historical victors" and are hurrying to represent the people of Russia or, more exactly, all Russians as the "vanquished." The Russians as a nation are being urged to repent morally for the real and imaginary sins of both communist and tsarist governments with regard to the other nationalities of the fallen empire. Moreover, some are talking about "reparations," say, in the form of the transfer of weapons of the former Soviet army now under the jurisdiction of Russia. Such claims are persistently made by republics which are virtually in a state of war (the Caucasian states and Moldova). Mention should be made also of the Ukraine's new claims to "operational guidance" of the Commonwealth's strategic nuclear forces and Kiev's demand of "guarantees" from NATO in the event of a conflict with... Russia, as it is clearly hinted.

No great imagination is needed to understand the dangers of such a policy. What is surprising, however, is the blindness of some Western politicians who are looking for dangers in a different place, in the great-power ambitions allegedly characteristic of Russia as a state and as a people. There is even the opinion that these ambitions are a sort of narcotic which seduce Russians into forgetting about their economic and other problems. It is alleged that the West's support of Russia can only impel Moscow to "restore its domination" over the newly independent states. As Henry Kissinger recently wrote in the *Washington Post*, in his original manner, to help Russia today is like standing a bottle of vodka before a drunkard who has only just been cured of alcoholism.

Since such analogies are being invoked it would be more appropriate to describe as "drunkards" those who cannot manage without the usual "enemy image." It is by no means a harmless habit. It affects the practical actions made by some colleagues of the former Secretary of State. How else to explain the ceremony held

in Kishinev by the newly appointed first American ambassador on the occasion of granting Moldova the most-favoured-nation status by the United States, right after Moldovan troops had savagely attacked the civilian population of Bendery. The American ambassador surprised even Moldovan leaders one of whom — the chairman of the parliament — exclaimed, "Never before has Moldova enjoyed such support from so powerful a state."

The same tendency is manifested in Pressler's amendment which links US aid to Russia with the withdrawal of its 14th army from the Dniester Republic or in the persistent demand for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic republics, though a political decision on this matter was reached long ago and the pullout is delayed only because technically it is a very complicated matter. However, much less attention is paid to violations against the human rights of Russian-speaking citizens of the Baltic republics. It should be noted that these violations become a sort of legalized apartheid by a recent government act, a new law or a "national referendum" by the indigenous population.

Are only Russians threatened with discrimination? It was noted at the International Congress on Anti-Semitism in Brussels that in the Baltic countries anti-Semitism is growing quicker than anywhere else in the world and that parallel with the rehabilitation of Stalin's victims there often develops a tendency to honour the memory of Nazi criminals. It is not accidental either that some people in Moldova and Romania are beginning to recall "the campaigns of Marshal Antonescu." The ghosts of people who had nothing in common with democracy are being revived.

It is Russia which today carries the banner of democracy, human rights, political and economic liberalism on one sixth of the world's land. However, Russian democracy finds it more and more difficult to hold this banner. The virus of national radicalism is spreading in Russia too, incidentally, under the influence of the neighbouring republics. It is a sort of responsive reaction. This explains why the Russian ultra-patriots attack Yeltsin's compromise policy with regard to former Soviet republics. This policy is only beginning to yield fruit, very fragile ones at that. It is vulnerable to the slightest frost, which could even lead to a brand-new glacial period in international relations.

Despite the pressure of its opponents and the inconsistency of its own policy, the Russian leadership is prepared to go more than half the way in order to prevent a retreat backwards in the former USSR and to make the victory over the cold war irreversible. The decision to withdraw troops from the Baltic states, despite obvious difficulties, by mid-1993, and the initiative for raising multilateral disengagement forces in Moldova and South Ossetia provide convincing proof of the seriousness of Moscow's intentions in this respect.

Dmitry Volsky

The hard road to a common home

After the collapse of the "iron curtain," not all the barriers between nations have crumbled. The nations are still divided by ethnic, psychological and social partitions which are not easy to step over. Is it worth trying to overstep them at all? This is what **Leonid GOLDIN**, D.Sc. (Philosophy), ponders over below

I have received a letter recently from Pamela Pauline, a Music Department Assistant Professor of New York University concerned with the work of the clarinetist Anton Stadler, Mozart's contemporary, whose name means little even to musicologists today. Stadler had given a concert in St. Petersburg in October 1791. The American researcher knows little about that guest performance. Over the past three years, she sent more than a hundred letters to Soviet archives, libraries, music institutions, made numerous phone calls, asked her acquaintances to help her get any information about Stadler's stay in Russia. Unfortunately, all her efforts were of no avail.

At first, I admired the New York musicologist's application and conscientiousness which are far from common among her colleagues in this country. Important political and economic forecasts are so vague that people put more trust in astrologists and clairvoyants than they do in professional politicians and economists. With all due respect, I was in no position to help her: subscribing to the Lenin Library is quite a problem, our archives are in an awful mess, it requires a lot of effort and time to look for advertisements and reviews in papers 200 years old, heaped up in basements without any order or system, just for the sake of reconstructing a week of an obscure musician's life... After all, Stadler was no Mozart...

I shared my amusement at the incident with some of my foreign friends working in Moscow. Surprisingly, all of them took Pamela's request seriously and sympathetically, making me feel an unresponsive, egoistic person. Nevertheless, instead of taking a few days off and going to Petersburg in search of information for Pamela, I tried to get across to my foreign opponents, as best I could, the meaning of the Russian saying: "I wish I had your problems instead of mine." Do you know, I asked them, how many people here are still trying, without success, to find out the fate of

their relatives and friends — victims of the GULAG, or of the last war? I, for one, do not know where the grave of my father, called up for active service in 1941, is. My arguments failed to convince them, and our relations cooled off markedly.

The secret of success

What's the point of this story? Personally, I have never managed to find a common language with a Westerner, either in political discussions, or in private conversations. This is not due to linguistic difficulties, clashes of opinion or emotional incompatibility. A visit to a shop in the centre of London was one of the most striking experiences I had ever had.

No sooner had I crossed the threshold than a black shop assistant addressed me in Russian. "Hello, come right in," he said. He had identified me at once. Mind you, I didn't wear a Cossack tunic, and my face didn't have "slav" written large on it.

The whole thing is that our background, our social environment and our very genes reject foreign economic and political relationships. Surprisingly, even the most serious researchers ignore the interconnection between the social system and personality traits, and fail to note the fact that models and solutions which have proved themselves elsewhere do not agree, as a rule, with our way of thinking and our traditions. Marx said — and even anti-Communists are not likely to put this view in question — that economic epochs and systems are distinguished not by what they produce, but by how they produce it. Who produces it also matters a great deal, I presume. Western marketing and management experts complain that Soviet businessmen learn too slowly. Even if Russian businessmen do well at Harvard, in real life they will find themselves in an entirely different situation. It's a sheer waste of time to try teach and learn in a classroom what is still more remote from our reality than

Khrushchev's maize chimeras or his projects to chemicalize the country.

Sociologists marvel at our emigrants' prosperity in the West and point out that they do much better than those coming from other countries. They are at a loss to explain this phenomenon. I don't think that this is due to our people's adaptability, to their promptly becoming almost indistinguishable from the "aborigines." It is rather on the contrary — the secret of their success is that they "remain themselves," that they think and act differently from their "hosts." This applies to scientists, businessmen and, incidentally, to criminals as well.

The first story

Here is a quotation from a manuscript written in a small American town: "He sat very still, with his eyes closed, in the 68th row of the Carnegie Hall, listening to the Boston Symphony Orchestra and drinking in every sound. He felt above the conductor of genius, above the brilliant orchestra, above Beethoven himself — the music did not elevate anyone so high. He was alone to understand the real meaning of that symphony, to fathom it. When thunderous applause broke out, when it was all over, he realized that he had not found the ticket in the street by chance, that God had revealed to him the secret beyond the reach of the others whose Fords and Toyotas were waiting outside the concert hall. The heartache, chronic of late, eased off a bit. Even his feeling of guilt over not having sold the ticket abated, although its worth could have bought him a pair of sneakers for the son and a phone call to his daughter in Moscow. It was difficult to walk in the rain, he leaned against the wall, and while his body was subsiding, he recalled much of the thirty years separating him from the Grand Hall of the Moscow Conservatoire when he had first heard the Symphony. The men who carried him to the ambulance on a stretcher did not hear the music which gradually crescendoed to an explosion, smashing to smithereens and transforming into eternal music world no longer divided into 'here' and 'there,' into what has been and what will be..."

"This is my first short story written in America," the author, aged 16, indicated in the postscript. I am certain that he is safe from competition on the part of his new fellow-citizens, even ones trained in the Juilliard School.

It had long seemed to me that all it took to achieve understanding with our neighbours on this planet was freedom of movement and freedom to make contacts. Now that East and West have drawn closer (but not yet close enough) together, it has become clear that neither the language barrier, nor politics, nor even the living standard can really separate nations. Proust's and Camus's Frenchmen,

Dickens' and Maugham's Englishmen, Faulkner's and Steinbeck's Americans have long caught our fancy. Even the exotic experiences of the Steppen Wolf or the Borges characters do not strike us as alien and obscure. Dali and Picasso have their admirers and critics "here" and "there," their heritage is transnational.

As to great music, it has always been planetary and supranational. Bach and Vivaldi, Borodin and Tchaikovsky, Karajan and Abbado, Mravinsky and Svetlanov have created a celestial world open to all and not divided by state frontiers or ethnic barriers. Musicians have been the first to realize and to prove, by their lives and work, that the idea of the Earth as a Common Home is not a cosmopolitan chimera. Great music belongs to each and all, just as the shining stars above do, and is as much of a miracle. "Professional patriots" are not alone to fear lest we should lose our distinctiveness on our way to the world community. Does it really pay to "conform"? Such apprehensions are ungrounded, I think. People are divided not only by political and economic coercion, by habits and traditions. God and Nature have created an infinite variety of ways of life and avenues of progress towards light and the truth.

Do we want to live under a common roof?

"The well-to-do countries," Natalya Bromley, a prominent scientist, a coordinator of the Soviet-American project, writes, "have a number of advantages over us, their social priority is to live comfortably, under a common roof, above ethnic differences." However, "living comfortably" and "living under a common roof" are not synonymous to many. A house without walls or with glass walls is not a very attractive prospect, especially to those born in communal flats with shared facilities.

Lamentably, the idea that each nation should seek to preserve its distinctive national culture, traditions and worldview has taken on a chauvinistic quality. The "Russian idea," the "American dream," the "Japanese wonder," German punctuality, English humour, even Zionism are notions not restricted to the limits of any one nation. Before becoming the property of all mankind, they are produced by the experience and social psychology of an individual nation or of an individual social stratum which has identified itself and which is aware of its interests.

We have accumulated a frightful experience of unification and standardization of humans and aims, and we have satisfied ourselves that it is impossible, and not much fun, to march into the happy future in formation. Is an idea rejected by an individual nation worth being reproduced on a world scale?

We are even prepared to abolish the intelligentsia on the grounds that Russia is the only country to have it — consequently, it is useless and even harmful. On the other hand, what worries us is the absence of the "middle class," the mainstay of Western civilization. As a result, we are even prepared to resign ourselves to the rule of the newly-rich whom some see as

the "salt of the earth" and the locomotive of progress.

Should we really seek uniformity in social organization and social psychology? We even listen to music differently from the way "they" do. Over there, a concert is an occasion for relaxation and enjoyment; we regard a concert as a religious service which brings us divine revelation and catharsis and stirs our souls. Our attitude to music is extremely emotional and highly personal, and each of us is sure that his opinion is as sound as that of a professional musicologist. As I leafed through a recent issue of *Time International*, I came across a phrase to the effect that disappointment at official policy compels people to turn to art which becomes "an arena of human rights grievances." As a result, the author goes on, the notion of the essence of art becomes distorted. Our own seekers of spiritual values see the mission of art in providing answers to the main questions — those having to do with the Universe and everyone's personal destiny.

Naturally, isolation and the "iron curtain," the ideology of "my country, right or wrong" patriotism have finally resulted in an urge to overstep the barrier, to partake of common human values. Whether we have come closer to them or has the taste of freedom awakened in us the archetypal characters of Russian classical literature — Chichikov and Oblomov, the brothers Karamazov, Firs and Korchagin? There is no simple answer to this question. On the other hand, the Americans definitely attribute the sweeping latter-day changes to the triumph of American ideals and to the materialization of the American Dream on new expanses.

Our intellectuals admired the government (which was uncharacteristic of them) on two occasions: at the dawn of *perestroika* and, for a very short while, after the events of August 1991. Everything promptly "came back to normal" — intellectual moralists squeamishly dissociated themselves from dirty politics and from reforms, and took to ridiculing the words and deeds of the rulers. An American, even a well-educated one, admires the declarations and slogans by his Presidents and governors which are as full of banalities and clichés as our own speechwriters' texts were in the period of stagnation.

Have we changed for the better?

Some may suspect me of singing the old tune about us being poor but highly idealistic, and about them being stuck in consumerism and pragmatism. Far be it from me to judge anyone, and whatever critical remarks I make are not levelled against the West. It is with bitter disappointment that I watch the relationships between my countrymen and foreigners deforming and assuming ugly forms. Previously, even families of modest means would accord every hospitality to a foreign guest; today a foreigner is identified with hard currency, and what is expected of him is not fresh information or progressive ideas, but help in business undertakings — often dishonest or downright criminal ones. Foreigners have become wary

of our "emancipated" fellow-citizens who may get one into a worse trouble than the KGB had ever dreamt of. Tourist groups and wealthy businessmen hire guards to keep black marketeers and racketeers away.

Speaking of music matters, Vladimir Panchenko, President of the world's largest concert organization (the legal successor to the Goskontsert), says that many of our musicians sitting out the troubled times abroad are in a panic: the prestige of Russian culture which was very high in the "personality cult" and "stagnation" periods has been damaged so badly that winning contracts and even getting invited to a decent home has become quite a problem. I have the impression that the long-awaited freedom of movement has not made our relationships with the West any purer, healthier or more sincere. Today our migrant citizens give a pain in the neck not to socialist frontier guards, but to Western statesmen.

Save our souls

It seems to me that most misunderstandings arise with the Americans for all the talk about the two nations being much alike. Even coincidence of interests, now common in big-time politics and private contacts does not spare one the feelings of confusion and frustration as one hears their discourses about our current circumstances and prospects or tries to share his notions to that effect.

Not surprisingly, Western reality comes as a shock to most Soviets who have seen only a black-and-white picture of it before. What they find to be the most agonizing experience is not so much the collapse of the old propaganda stereotypes, according to which the US strategic objective is to enslave the Soviet people and to lay its hands on our wealth, as the overcoming of illusions about the American way of life and thinking which, on inspection, turn out to be not so attractive, after all.

The Westerner has long learned the lessons of history, he is a product of an infinitely varied society. The long road to a democratic organization of society, combined with the maintenance of law and order goes through the collapse of empires, bloody civil wars, a frightful rise in crime and famine. Nowhere have socio-economic and geopolitical paradigms ever been changed in accordance with plans or models worked out at political headquarters or academies. Britain still has its Ulster, and Canada its Quebec; the recent tragic events in Los Angeles have shown that even the USA, the melting pot, still has a long way to go before it finally solves its racial problems. These countries are immensely rich as compared to ours, and their present social systems took shape centuries ago. In the former USSR, there are thousands of Ulsters and Quebecs which are much less manageable, while destructive processes underway here surpass positive changes by far in intensity.

The world community has made every effort to resolve the crisis in the Middle East which involves fratricidal conflicts. That region have every attribute of the modern economy (free market, convertible currencies, new technology) and of modern society



(a multi-party system and an active opposition in most countries) — but no peace and civil accord now or in prospect. And what about India and Yugoslavia, which have long had, and still have, what reformers are trying to introduce in the former Soviet empire? Just leaf through the pages of our own history and see how long it takes new economic relations, the middle class, the law-abiding entrepreneurial community, the sense of personal responsibility and new work morals to take shape. And note that all this will take much longer in a society where communist ideology, engendered but rejected by the West, found a fertile ground and active mass support.

Why are the Americans so optimistic about our outlook for the future? Why are they so sure that a dozen or so of new laws — even though adopted under pressure from the IMF and Western advisers — will rectify the situation? Can the government guarantee the observance of these laws, any more than it could guarantee the observance of the previous ones? What difference will a few tens of billions of dollars in credits and aid make to us, considering that we have already squandered and looted hundreds of billions of dollars; that now big money is being made by methods which are pernicious to the economy and which would be regarded as criminal in any civilized country; and that the illegal export of capital from our poverty-stricken country exceeds foreign investments many times over?

Competence the only criterion

Endless rows of stalls offering various merchandise, and crowds of street hawkers make a favourable impression on an American tourist in Russia who regards them as symptoms of a market economy. Actually, what all this amounts to is reselling essential goods for exorbitant profit — a swindle almost the entire nation is getting involved in amid the wholesale curtailment of production. The government is trying to play monetary games, to create the impression that despite its tough and unpopular economic policy it is still in control; but the

country is tailspinning into chaos and anarchy, and neither a new Bolshevik dictator, nor a champion of total privatization will be able to arrest this process. Under the consequences, as one hears Richard Nixon to allege in Moscow that 100 billion dollars can be invested in Russia over the next 18 months, to be followed by 200 and 400 billion over the two subsequent 18-month periods, one cannot help drawing the conclusion that the American ex-President's standard of political responsibility and competence is comparable with that demonstrated by a colleague and friend of his, Mikhail Gorbachev, during his recent US tour.

These two are figures of the past, however. Now, when US Ambassador Robert Strauss speaks in the same vein, this is something else again. His logic is hard to grasp: on one occasion he says, frankly, that he would not invest more than 10,000 dollars in the Russian economy; on another occasion he tries to encourage wealthy American investors to deal with this country. I regret his reputation and the money he intends to invest in haberdashery trade in Moscow by way of an example for others to follow. Ambassador Strauss still seems to think that the former republics' conflicts with Russia are nothing but quarrels between teenage children and their father which will be patched up as the children mature and get wiser.

America needs a strong Russia

It goes without saying that the world should not just "sit idly by" and wait for a new global crisis threatened by the death agony of the totalitarian monster. A worldwide proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons from the former USSR, the geopolitical and revanchist claims by China, Japan, Germany, the "Islamic factor," the "Balkanization" of Europe — the world will get all this, and more, from Pandora's box which is now open. Just sitting tight and waiting, without doing anything about it all, would be a crime against the contemporary generations and those to come.

To begin with, we must cast all illusions aside and realize that *perestroika* — which was not a joint effort of Gorbachev and the CIA, but a product of an objective course of events — has brought new threats to mankind. Those referred to as the architects of *perestroika*, along with a mass of politicians, scientists and journalists who have actually misled their country and the West, have turned out to be false prophets. I am not saying that this has been a deliberate fraud (and, incidentally, I do not think that the Bolsheviks have been deliberately lying primarily), and it is not my purpose to look for new scapegoats. It's no use blaming anyone for inaccurate forecasts — after all, politicians, like ordinary people, hear only what they care to hear; this is, perhaps, the only point Russia and the USA have in common. I am convinced that the US, Britain and German Embassy officials turned a deaf ear to those who warned them about the controversial nature of the changes in the USSR, that the Americans kept away from the Universities and from mass media those scientists and journalists who were pessimistic about the outlook for *perestroika*. After I had made a few sceptical remarks in a private conversation, the American I was talking with warned me against repeating them in America. The Americans, who tend to simplify matters (except the stock exchange situation) may pay a dear price for their self-assurance and near-sightedness, I am afraid.

Neither prosperity nor degradation of the peoples of the USSR is No. 1 problem for America, of course. America certainly wants to see the military-industrial complex of the USSR defunct beyond repair, which is only natural of the winners in a war, even though a cold one. However, the Soviet military-industrial complex makes up 70 percent of the country's economy, constituting its very foundation, mentality, core. I am certain, though, that America will have no cause to rejoice at what is happening now.

I do not expect America to become more sober-minded in the near future. Political struggle and presidential election call for populist words and deeds, for recipes and solutions understandable to the man-in-the-street, for promises of quick victories and successes. In today's United States, there are no reputable leaders who would have the courage to say that mankind is now as much in danger as it was on the eve of World War II. When such warnings come from Russia, they are naturally taken as blackmail and extortion, and their implication is interpreted as "if you don't save us, you'll perish yourselves."

Indeed, the Americans needn't try and save Russia, all the more so that owing to their misunderstanding of our circumstances and to differences in mentality, their effort creates more problems, perhaps, than it solves. In any case, though, they will need a world situation where they can keep their well-being. Today it is as much in jeopardy as it was in the time of confrontation between socialism and capitalism. America will need a strong Russia yet.

Why the West is not aiding Russia

Backing reforms and backing the nomenclatura are two different things

In its time, the USSR had in the West only clients and debtors. Russia, on the contrary, has real friends there today. The USSR never had such a "capital of sympathy" in Europe and the United States comparable to what Russia has today. For the West the entire Soviet Union was a soulless system, a frigid monster. However, today Russia is seen differently by the West as a living culture, that is, an integral part of our Western world. Hence the theories currently propagated by those who, due to a definite misunderstanding, are termed "Slavophiles" and "patriots," that is, theorists urging rupture with a supposedly non-loving-Russia West have no foundation. Notwithstanding, it would be worthwhile warning Russians not to succumb to lyrical illusions. Europeans have far from focussed on what is taking place in Russia and do not at all think their destinies depend on the reforms being implemented, or rather not being implemented, there nowadays. Consequently, despite Western sympathy for the great Russian people who are now beset with such difficulties, despite the compassion, there is to be discerned in the



West not only a certain loss of interest, but also a certain lassitude with respect to the problems with which Russia has been "showering" it of late.

To sum up: to be observed in the West's attitude to Russia are both that "capital of sympathy" and an emerging trend towards indifference to what is taking place there. There exists the danger of a drastic change from what is on the whole a positive attitude to one that is sharply negative. Allow me to examine two hypotheses that could bring about the said change. First, the West would find absolutely distasteful Russia's transformation into a Serbia on a still grander scale, implying conflict with her troublesome neighbours of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, coupled with mounting instability in relations with CIS partners and CIS borders.

The West would like to see Russia as seeking peace with her neighbours, as negotiating, not going to war with them. Another worrisome matter is that we would be most reluctant to again have ourselves deceived by Russia as we were once before by Gorbachev's Soviet Union.

Let me remind you that between 1986 and 1991 the Soviet government received as debts and sundry gifts \$60 billion for its perestroika. Where has that money gone? We know that \$15 billion went down the drain generally, possibly spent by civilian and military leaders. The remaining \$45 billion was wasted only to prolong

the old system's agony. Not a single kopeck was invested in a new economy and naturally, not a single kopeck will be reimbursed. To some extent Western governments and taxpayers tacitly brooked that, deciding salvation from communism and the liberation of Central Europe from Soviet troops were worth it.

However, why should the West finance the projected reforms, if Russia is not implementing any real reforms and if the Yeltsin-Gaidar government is using Western credits no better than the government did under Gorbachev? That is why the West, though talking so much about providing aid, is for the time being not rushing to invest. Indeed, in the view of the Western taxpayer, to whom, incidentally, this money belongs, it could find a much better application at home than in Russia. Aid will be withheld until the Russian government guarantees the West that these credits and gifts are used for concrete projects, not to finance the upkeep of the self-same unchangeable nomenclatura.

In that respect Prime Minister Gaidar's projects reassure the West only partly, some 50 percent. His programme envisages economic advancement only several years hence and does not warrant hopes for a progressively growing private sector. Western capital will be defroze when the heads of European and American enterprises have as negotiating partners not functionaries or ministers seeking exclusively to consolidate their own power, but interlocutors, who really want to engage in production. Joint development between Russia and the West is envisageable only if the West is able to deal directly with genuine Russian enterprises, motivated by profit. So far that is not to be observed.

Generally speaking, the "capital of sympathy" which Russia has accumulated in the West will transform into financial capital only when the Russian government really transfers economic power to the new class of entrepreneurs. So far that is but a vague promise. Let me add that privatization is not the only solution. I even think privatization in Russia will be a long uphill job, which for that matter is everywhere. The alternative, or rather the complement to privatization could be international credit exclusively for new entrepreneurs, bypassing all currently existing state enterprises. That is a totally new idea. However, the historical situation in which Russia has now found herself is also absolutely new. This new situation calls for radically new forms of East-West cooperation that are not to be found so far in any textbook on economics.

Guy Sorman,

French political scientist and writer

DOSSIER

PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING LAND TAX RATES ON THE BASIS OF NORMATIVE PRICE OF LAND

1. Determination of Land Tax Rates

Land tax rates for each year shall be determined per square measure unit of the allotted lands in accordance with the average tax and the average rates stipulated in the Law of the RSFSR "On Payment for Land."

Land tax rates shall be determined separately for all categories of land assigned for special use, types and subtypes of agricultural lands, natural-climatic zones, types of soil, cities, settlements, zones of big settlements.

For all lands situated in suburban areas of cities with a population exceeding 500,000, health resorts, rest zones of Moscow and St. Petersburg, irrespective of special use they are assigned to (with the exception of the lands belonging to agricultural enterprises and cooperatives, associations and farms), the land tax rates shall be calculated by applying the progressive coefficients stipulated in the Law of the RSFSR "On Payment for Land" (Appendix 2, Tables 2 and 4). If lands are situated in the sphere of influence of several aforesaid factors one of the coefficients – the highest – shall be applied.

Progressive coefficients shall be applied only in respect of suburban areas, rest zones and health resorts, the boundaries of which are confirmed in conformity with the established order. The recreative value of rest zones and health resorts shall be determined by the respective Soviets of People's Deputies.

Land tax rates shall be reconsidered due to the change of the system of prices, the indices of land evaluation, the special aims for which the land is assigned and due to other reasons over which land users have no control and which entail the change of land-tenure conditions.

2. The land tax rates for agricultural lands shall be fixed to an approximation of one ruble per hectare according to the types of lands – arable land, long-fallow land, perennial plantations, hayfields, pastures. The rates shall be determined separately for unreclaimed, irrigated and drained arable lands as well as for plots of soil under roofing (hotbeds and hothouses). For other agricultural lands such elaborate rates shall be fixed if the

information on the evaluation of these lands is available.

3. For a constituent republic in the Russian Federation, a territory, a region, an autonomous region and autonomous area, the average tax rate per hectare of unreclaimed arable land shall be accepted as a basic level (Appendix 1 to the Law of the RSFSR "On Payment for Land"). The differentiation of the average land tax rates for agricultural lands and types of soils shall be accomplished on the basis of indices of land rent in accordance with the natural agricultural zones of the Russian Federation or directly in accordance with the evaluation of land.

4. The average tax rate for irrigated, drained arable land, plots of soil under roofing, perennial plantations, hayfields and pastures shall be determined according to the zonal character of utilizing such lands and according to their relative productivity or profitability (rent portion of income) as compared with unreclaimed arable land.

While carrying out the primary differentiation of the basic tax rate in 1992, the coefficients of ratio between productivity and profitability of agricultural lands shall be calculated for administrative and territorial units or their natural zones (land evaluation regions). In doing so, productivity norms of agricultural lands shall be determined on the basis of:

a) average actual productivity of one hectare of agricultural lands during the last five years according to the average (in a territory or in a zone) structure of crop areas;

b) evaluated productivity according to the average structure of crop areas for several years which was accepted while evaluating lands.

Profitability norms may be calculated on the basis of:

a) selling price of agricultural produce according to the average actual level of productivity and inputs in 1990-91;

b) selling price of agricultural produce according to the evaluated level of productivity and inputs with due regard for their increase in 1991 as compared with the inputs at the time of land evaluation.

Basic economic indices for the aforesaid calculations shall be accepted according to the land evaluation data and statistical reports (consolidated annual reports of agricultural enterprises etc.). Calculative selling prices of fodder crops shall be fixed on the basis of the average cost price of one metric center of fodder units of these crops in 1990-1991 and the aggregate norm of the profitability of animal products.

The average tax rates for reindeer pastures shall be determined on the basis of the ratio of their productivity (taking into account reindeer capacity of pastures) to the productivity of unreclaimed arable land and the basic tax rate on it.

In the autonomous areas where there are no arable lands in the structure of agricultural lands, the average tax rates for hayfields, pastures and reindeer pastures shall be determined on the basis of the ratio of their productivity to the productivity of unreclaimed lands in the territories with similar natural and climatic conditions and the minimum tax rate (10 rubles per hectare).

The land tax rates for the types of soil set aside in evaluating agricultural lands shall be calculated on the basis of the average tax rates for administrative and territorial units according to agricultural productivity. The tax rates for soil types shall be calculated by means of multiplying respective bonitas marks by the price of one mark. The price of bonitas marks for types and subtypes of agricultural lands shall be the same in every constituent republic in the Russian Federation, every territory, region, autonomous region, autonomous area and shall be determined on the basis of the average tax rates and bonitas marks.

In case there is no data available on the evaluation of irrigated and drained arable lands, soils under roofing and perennial plantations, the tax rates for them shall be determined on the basis of the tax rates for similar soil types of unreclaimed arable land and the coefficient of the ratio of the

**MOSCOW
BUSINESS WEEK**

DOSSIER

profitability (productivity) of the types of agricultural land to the profitability (productivity) of unreclaimed arable land.

With the purpose of economically stimulating the effective use of the most valuable agricultural lands the average land tax rates for them shall not be less than the tax levied on unreclaimed arable land.

The tax rates for long-fallow land shall be equal to the tax rates for respective soil types of unreclaimed arable land.

The tax rates for reindeer pastures shall be determined according to the types of lands of different fodder value on the basis of the average tax rate for reindeer pastures in an administrative and territorial unit and the indices of their productivity (their reindeer capacity).

In order to calculate the tax rates for non-agricultural lands situated outside populated areas (Clauses 9 and 10 of the Law of the RSFSR "On Payment for Land") the Supreme Soviets of the constituent republics of the Russian Federation, Soviets of People's Deputies of territories, regions, autonomous regions and autonomous areas shall fix average land tax rates for agricultural lands in the respective territories in general and also in administrative districts (as weighed rates according to the structure of these agricultural lands). In forest regions average tax rates in general for a region or for large forestries shall be determined on the basis of the assessed average value of ripe timber of the given region (enterprise).

With the purpose of unifying the land tax rates for agricultural lands, types of soil close to each other by quality may be included into one category.

5. The tax rates for lands within the boundaries of rural populated areas shall be fixed as one kopeck per square meter. Rural Soviets of People's Deputies taking into account the favourable situation of plots may increase tax rates by not more than twofold.

The tax rates for rural lands of gardening and stock-breeding associations and cooperatives for building country cottages, as well as for plots used for individual and collective vegetable gardening, shall be fixed as one kopeck per square meter. The Soviets of People's Deputies presiding over those lands may increase tax rates by not more than twofold.

6. The land tax rates within the boundaries of cities, workers' settlements, health resort settlements, and summer cottage communities shall be fixed by Soviets of People's Deputies of cities and settlements in accordance with Appendix 2 to the Law of the RSFSR "On Payment for Land."

7. The average tax rate for a particular city or a settlement of the respective economic region shall be fixed according to the norms of Table 1 of Appendix 2 to the Law of the RSFSR "On Payment for Land."

For the cities and settlements situated in health

resort regions in the rest zones of Moscow and St. Petersburg, in the suburban zones of cities with a population exceeding 500,000, and for the capitals of the constituent republics in the Russian Federation and for the capitals of territories and regions, including cities with developed socio-cultural potential (secondary and higher educational establishments, scientific research centres, theatres, concert halls, etc.), the norm from Table 1 of Appendix 2 related to the respective city or settlement shall be increased as a multiple of the coefficients from tables 2 and 4 of the same Appendix. If a settlement is situated in the sphere of influence of several aforesaid factors, only one of the coefficients — the highest — shall be applied.

8. In the cities and settlements where the complex economic evaluation of the territory was carried out, the data of this evaluation shall serve as the basis for determining the indices of town development value of the territory and of the differentiation of the average land tax rates in a city and a settlement according to the zones of different town development value on the basis of the approved project planning documents (general layouts of cities, settlements, industrial centres, projects of detailed planning, diagrams, district layout projects, etc.).

9. In the cities and settlements where the documents on the complex economic evaluation of the territory are not available, temporarily and prior to carrying out such an evaluation, the differentiation of the average tax rates can be accomplished according to the evaluation carried out by experts while taking into account documents on project planning and systems of land use, as well as other necessary documents. The coefficients of relative value of the territory shall be determined by experts while taking into account the following factors:

- access to the city centre, places of work, cultural and service institutions;
- level of the engineering development and the provision of amenities in the territory and on building sites;
- level of cultural and personal services provided for the population;
- aesthetic, historical value of building and landscape value of the territory;
- state of the natural environment, sanitary and microclimate conditions;
- engineering and geological conditions for building work and degree to which the territory is subject to natural destructive elements;
- recreational value of the territory.

10. The tax rates according to the zones of town development value shall be approved by City and Settlement Soviets of People's Deputies. The sum total of the land tax levied on the taxable territory

in a city or a settlement in general and calculated according to its zones shall be equal to the sum total of the tax levied in accordance with average rates for the given city or settlement and determined in conformity with Paragraph 7 of the present Procedure.

11. In the zones of historic and cultural monuments protection, the zones of controlled building and other city districts of historic value, the progressive coefficients of Table 3 of Appendix 2 to the Law of RSFSR "On Payment for Land" shall be applied on the representation of the city authorities in charge of protecting historic and cultural monuments when taxing the lands of owners, proprietors and users violating territory protection conditions.

12. The tax rates in cities and settlements for lands where dwelling houses are situated (state, public, cooperative or personal) shall amount to 3 percent of the tax rate for the respective zone of a city or a settlement.

13. The tax rates in cities and settlements for agricultural lands, lands belonging to gardening and stockbreeding associations, personal subsidiary farms (including land under buildings and structures) and plots used for vegetable gardening shall amount to one kopeck per square meter. In the stipulated cases the progressive coefficients of Tables 2 and 4 of Appendix 2 to the Law of the RSFSR "On Payment for Land" shall be applied.

14. The tax rates in cities and settlements for plots for country cottages, land under personal and cooperative garages shall amount to 3 percent of the land tax rates for the respective zone of a city or a settlement. The tax for the part of plots exceeding no more than two times the quota of land assigned for building country cottages and garages shall amount to 15% of the tax rate and, for the part of plots exceeding the quota, more than two times the amount to the total rate of this tax.

15. The tax rates for land situated outside settlements belonging to industrial enterprises (including quarries and sand-pits, as well as territories deteriorated by production activities), transport and communication enterprises, broadcasting and television enterprises, informatics enterprises and enterprises serving space research as well as for lands allotted for ensuring the activities of state and government bodies of the Russian Federation, the armed forces, the frontier troops, the home troops, the railway troops and other non-agricultural users shall amount to the threefold average tax rate for agricultural lands (Paragraph 4 of the present Procedure).

The tax rates for the lands outside settlements under airfields, test grounds (with the exception of military ones) shall be equal to the average tax rates for agricultural lands in the district (Paragraph 4 of the Procedure) of if in the district forest exploitation prevails shall be equal to the average tax rates for lands under forest of exploitative value (Paragraph 16 of the Procedure).

**MOSCOW
BUSINESS WEEK**

DOSSIER

For all non-agricultural lands outside settlements, the average tax rates in the territory may be differentiated in more detail by the Soviets of People's Deputies of territories, regions, autonomous regions and autonomous areas while taking into account the approved diagrams and projects of district planning, the complex evaluation and functional zoning of the territory.

16. The tax rates for lands under forests of exploitative value where timber felling is carried out shall be determined on the basis of the statutory prices of standing timber valid at the time of calculating the tax and the amount of timber which may be felled according to a timber felling permit. The tax rates shall be equal to 5 per cent of the statutory price of amount of timber which can be felled according to a permit in main timber-felling sites and timber-felling rehabilitation sites.

17. For agricultural lands within the forest stock, the tax rates shall be equal to the tax rates for agricultural lands of similar quality.

18. The tax rates for the lands belonging to the

forest stock assigned for recreational purposes in accordance with the established order shall be equal to 5 per cent of the statutory value of the total amount of timber in this territory calculated according to the documents on the system of forest use.

19. The tax rates for the lands of water reserves outside settlements assigned for economic activities and recreational purposes shall be equal to the average tax rates for agricultural lands in the administrative district.

II. Determination of Normative Prices of Land

20. Normative prices of land are applied for ensuring the economic regulation of land relations in case of turning over property rights of land to citizens, establishing collective-apportionment proprietorship of land, inheritance, donation, getting bank credit on the security of a plot and other cases stipulated in the land legislation of the Russian Federation.

21. The normative price of land for particular

plots shall be equal to the fiftyfold land tax rate in rubles per square measure unit of the lands assigned for the respective specific use. The minimum land tax rate shall be equal to 100 rubles per hectare.

In determining the normative price of land, the land tax rates including the relevant progressive coefficients, shall serve as a basis. While calculating, the normative price of land tax privileges are not taken into consideration.

When turning over plots of land in cities and settlements to citizens as their property for building houses and setting up personal subsidiary farms, as well as for gardening and stock-breeding, the normative price of land shall be fixed on the basis of the land tax rate for this category of payers.

22. Local Soviets of People's Deputies, when selling plots on a competitive basis, shall have the right to increase their normative price by not more than 50 percent. While selling plots by auction and selling the plots which were mortgaged in a bank and not redeemed, their price shall not be limited.

LAW OF THE RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATIVE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC ON INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT

Article 1.

The investment tax credit is construed to mean a postponement of tax payment granted to the enterprises, listed in this Law, by public authorities or taxation bodies in accordance with the procedure and conditions established by this Law.

The investment tax credit is hereinafter referred to as the "tax credit."

Article 2.

Enterprises with an average number of employees not exceeding 200 (up to 200 employees working in industry and construction; up to 100 — in science and scientific service; up to 50 — in other branches of production; up to 15 — in non-production branches and retail trade) are entitled to re-

duce an amount of tax payment by 10 percent of the prices of:

1) equipment manufactured in the Russian Federation, purchased and put into commission, with the price of its spare parts, purchased outside the Russian Federation, making not more than 40 per cent of the total price of this equipment, used directly and completely for:

a) replacement of formerly imported equipment;

b) carrying out research and development works by the enterprise, as well as selling the results of these works;

c) environmental protection from pollution;

2) equipment, purchased and put into commission, and mentioned in Point 1 of this Article, with a service life of more than eight years (as part of the depreciation policy of the enterprise);

3) computer-controlled automatic lines and automated sectors, made in the Russian Federation, purchased and put into commission, with the price of its complementary parts purchased outside the Russian Federation, making not more than 50 per cent of the total price of the equipment;

4) equipment intended for creating jobs for the handicapped.

The average number of employees of an enterprise consists of employees on the staff of the enterprise, including those holding several jobs, as well as non-staff persons (employed for contract work on the basis of contracts envisaged by the civil law).

Granting a tax credit, the taxation bodies

**MOSCOW
BUSINESS WEEK**

DOSSIER

have the right to increase the aforementioned percentage in accordance with the procedure and conditions envisaged by legislation of the constituent republics of the Russian Federation, by decisions of Soviets of People's Deputies of territories, regions, autonomous regions and autonomous districts.

In all cases of the granting of a tax credit to an enterprise, the conditions of a credit agreement (before it is concluded) are agreed upon by a taxation body with a financial body responsible for the execution of the relevant budget.

Article 3.

The price of equipment for the purposes of calculation of the sum of a tax credit is considered to be the price at which it was purchased, and, in the case of the exchange of commodities, the market (stock exchange) price of this equipment at the moment of transaction.

Article 4.

The enterprises mentioned in Article 2 of this Law are granted a tax credit in the form of lower advance payments calculated in conformity with the Law of the RSFSR "On Income Tax of Enterprises" for the calendar year. Besides, the total of the tax credit and tax concessions granted to these enterprises in accordance with the said Law, should not decrease the sum of the tax on the actual income, derived in the calendar year, by more than 50 per cent.

Article 5.

In order to receive a tax credit, the enterprises mentioned in Article 2 of this Law conclude a credit agreement with a taxation body belonging to the place of registration of the enterprise. The form of the credit agreement is established by the Public Tax Service of the Russian Federation in coordination with the Ministry of Economy and Finance of the RSFSR. Here, the taxation body is not entitled to demand from the enterprise:

a) proceeding to credit payment earlier than within two years after the date of signing the agreement, as well as repayment of the tax credit within a period of less than five years, if another period is not agreed upon with the enterprise;

b) fixing interest on the amount of the granted tax credit exceeding compound interest of inflation, recognized as the official index of inflation by the Government of the Russian Federation ascertained for the

period of the credit agreement by the relevant body.

Article 6.

A privatized enterprise is entitled to receive a tax credit to the amount of payments for interest accrued on the sum of a target-oriented credit, granted by a commercial bank to a partnership, organized by the members of a labour collective for the purpose of buying back the entire property of this enterprise or part of it. The said enterprise must comprise more than half of the total number of persons employed at this enterprise.

Article 7.

The enterprises mentioned in Article 6 of this Law are granted a tax credit to the amount of tax payments calculated in accordance with the Law of the RSFSR "On the Tax on the Property of Enterprises" less the accrued sum on the interest on a credit received by the members of a labour collective for the purpose of buying back the entire property of this enterprise or part of it. In this case, the accrued sum must not decrease the amount of tax payment by more than 50 percent. The sum accrued on the interest on the credit for the purpose of buying back the entire property of the enterprise or part of it is allocated in equal quotas per quarterly tax payments not exceeding 1/20 of this sum per quarter.

Article 8.

In order to receive a tax credit, the enterprises mentioned in Article 6 of this Law, in conformity with the established form, conclude a credit agreement with a taxation body belonging to the place of registration of the enterprise. Here the taxation body is not entitled to demand from the enterprise:

a) fixing interest on the amount of the granted tax credit exceeding compound interest of inflation, recognized as the official index of inflation by the Government of Russian Federation and ascertained for the period of the credit agreement by the relevant body;

b) repayment of the tax credit within a period of less than five years since the moment of proceeding to its receipt, if another period is not agreed upon with the enterprise.

The enterprise is not entitled to demand

that the taxation body should postpone the moment of proceeding to the credit repayment for more than three years from the date of signature of the credit agreement.

Article 9.

Public authorities are entitled to grant, by means of conclusion of a credit agreement, tax credits to enterprises in other cases and on other terms not envisaged by articles 2, 5, 6 and subitems "a" and "b" of Article 8 of this Law.

Article 10.

An enterprise — tax credit recipient is liable for untimely repayment of the credit in accordance with the procedure and conditions envisaged by the Law of the Russian Federation "On the Fundamentals of the Tax System of the Russian Federation."

President of the RSFSR

Boris YELTSIN

Moscow, House of Soviets of the RSFSR

December 20, 1991,

No.2071-1

DECREE

of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on the Procedure of Enactment of the Law of the RSFSR "On Investment Tax Credit"

The Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR hereby decrees:

1. To enact the Law of the RSFSR "On Investment Tax Credit" as of January 1, 1992.

2. The Legislative Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR is bound to submit, as of January 15, 1992, for the consideration of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, a proposal on how to bring the RSFSR legislative acts in line with the aforementioned Law.

3. The Government of the Russian Federation should bring, as of February 1, 1992, the decisions of the Government of the Russian Federation in line with the said Law.

4. The Public Tax Service of the Russian Federation, by agreement with the Ministry of Economy and Finance of the RSFSR, should issue an instruction on application of the said Law.

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the

RSFSR

Ruslan KHASBULATOV

Moscow, House of Soviets of the RSFSR

December 20, 1991,

No.2072-1

**MOSCOW
BUSINESS WEEK**

From the commonly owned to private ownership

Privatization, about the need for which the government has been talking endlessly, seems to have got off onto a start. Indeed, after heated debates, the Supreme Soviet, the Russian Parliament finally accepted amendments to the "Law on the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation" along with the privatization programme for this year. Still it is hard to say whether there is social consensus as regards ways and means of privatizing state-owned enterprises and the respective deadlines. How do ideologues of the two parliamentary factions of Russian Unity and the Coalition for Reform see this?

Vladimir ISAKOV:



"Survival, not privatization"

Encountering resistance to its privatization programme and failure to understand it, the government is bureaucratizing the process, is casing out work collectives, is restricting the powers of the Soviets and is extending a purely administrative machinery, which I think extremely dangerous tendencies. In effect, they have bankrupted a vast number of enterprises, while their model for privatization puts collective owners out in the cold, though there is simply no other alternative today. The simple effective way to privatize is to hand over property to collectives desirous of acquiring it.

On the other hand, giving everyone a piece of property removes all realistic incentives for raising performance on the job and simultaneously generates a convenient medium for sundry sharks, who by gobbling up petty owners, will thus aggregate large fortune. Such is the machinery our government seeks to trigger off.

Yet the government has demonstrated with figures at its fingertips that if everything is given the work collectives others will get only some 500 rubles per head.

Let's see first whence the notion of

socialist concept of an extremely crude nature. Again we have levelling, apportionment, however not according to the work done, but per person. The government has touted this concept only because it very well realizes that this will generate a wonderful medium for the emergence of Big Business.

At present, people hope to get a bit of property but later, when they come to realize that they were hoodwinked, they will feel disgusted. Eventually, they will find out that what they got was really just a symbolical slip of paper, but that what they lost was every vestige of social protection by the state. As I see it, we must take a totally different road.

Why not compensate everyone, should he so desire, by complementing his savings bank account? Why not furnish him with a medical insurance policy? Why not give him state securities entitling him to guaranteed dividends? I advocate plurality as regards personal involvement in the economy, plus sundry forms of social protection. But what is actually going on is that we are being booted up a blind alley.

What we will see is one enormous crush, a stampede, with people trampling over others, but with a few profiting by going over their heads. Today only the MPs see that, but soon everyone will realize it. I really don't know what will they say about us and our government.

The government proceeds from the thesis which the President put forward at the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, to wit: "What we need

privatization vouchers come. Whence this concept of printing a vast number of slips of paper, apportioning them out and giving every one a little bit of the wealth the entire state owns?

From Czecho-Slovakia, evidently.

It was borrowed directly from Czecho-Slovakia, though basically it is a grand

Unemployment in Eastern Europe
percent of the able-bodied population, 1992 figures - estimated



are millions of private owners, not just a hundred or more millionaires." Or do you think it has reneged on this slogan which so appeals to everyone?

By touting this slogan, the government is actually implementing a policy of creating millionaires, big property owners.

Do you really think that was Boris Yeltsin's real purpose? Or do you think he is so incompetent economically as not to understand where the government is booting us, as you put it?

I think he has long failed to understand what is taking place in the country.

We often lambast the Federal government for everything, unmindful that provincial administrative offices are still captained by hard-bitten bureaucrats, with a goodly knowledge of how economic management proceeded before. Perhaps provincial administrators should be changed?

Locally, the concept of privatization vouchers will be so adroitly handled that people might not get anything at all. Recall the stupendous fiasco witnessed of the presumably good notion of the "Harvest-90" vouchers. Actually, they were embezzled and then the commodities they were supposed to provide were also stolen. Can anyone guarantee that the privatization vouchers will not come to the same sorry end? In that case entire segments of the population, such as peasants and pensioners, will learn with amazement that something was due them.

We have just had a government reshuffle. Don't you think that will serve to amend the said programme?

To be frank; I'm not interested in what is going on in the corridors of power. Economics and life generally depend on that, but not to the extent we think. In any case, this government has no head. Though I believe the industrialists thus introduced are a more sober-thinking lot, they won't be able to rectify the situation. They simply won't be able to achieve anything.

Why so?

Well, there are two reasons. First, the time for a really serious radical reform has already been lost. The country has been plunged into crisis and hence all aims and tasks should have been reinterpreted. The question today is one of survival, not of privatization. That is the Number One task. Of course, there are subjective reasons. Second, what I see is that after a time the clever, talented men installed in the government, men who evoke sympathy and respect, degenerate into mute, faceless executors of Heaven knows whose volition.

Having seen that occur time after time, I have reached the conclusion that that is the

President's style. He is used to being accompanied by small fry. Any government trying to work in such conditions will inevitably disintegrate. Each man must have a clear idea of his duties and responsibilities. But, we haven't had that, and while Yeltsin is in charge, we won't have that. I am convinced of that.

Do you think Yeltsin should resign only as head of the government?

I think he has used up his credibility over and above. Of course, I want the problem

resolved in a constitutional way. Then we could also have a compromise, retaining the President as such, as many still trust him, but categorically abstaining from intervention in economic activity. That should be the job of the professional, not of the dilettante gambler, of the type to which our President belongs. That is why the opposition feels itself bound to call for his resignation and the creation of a coalition government that would enjoy the nation's trust.

Pyotr FILIPPOV:



"We want owners with a creative mentality"


Though Vladimir Isakov and his following pretend to champion the work collectives, we well realize that what they really want is to have property re-allotted to those standing on the top rungs of the bureaucratic ladder who not always are inclined to engage in commercial activity. The more property an enterprise may control, the easier it is for its directors to handle it. If you are to ask any employee at a leased enterprise how much of it he

owns, he will goggle, as he is baffled and doesn't even know at times that he enjoys any rights to property.

The managers take advantage of this situation and successfully sidetrack the work collectives. To show that this is so, it is enough to watch how leased trade offices operate. Within each such leased trade office, as the single leaseholder, they shut down now one now another cafeteria and lay off employees. There hasn't been a

Growth of prices in Eastern Europe

percent for each year, 1992 figures - estimated



single case when such a sacked person would go to court to have his bit of property given him because of dismissal. However, in his place another person is hired, however, already as a wage earner.

Has really no one ever protested?

Well, when anyone tries to do so, he is at best given his share as money, according to the price recorded in the office's balance sheet. From the angle of present prices, a building nowadays may go for several million rubles, but the residual cost balance-sheet price, considering that the said building was erected some hundred years ago; will not be more than several dozen thousand rubles. This sum is divided among the personnel and thus the person in question is told that what is due is just a measly 1,500 rubles, which means that instead of getting 100,000 rubles or more, the person gets no more than what is today a ridiculously low sum. That, incidentally, is typical, and what Russia's communists want is that sort of privatization. They demonstrate an obstinacy worthy of a better cause when deliberately confusing the concept of "employee" with that of "property owner."

What changes, then, have they nevertheless managed to inject into the privatization bill?

They have managed to reduce the compensation share, which is paid out as a lump sum, from 20 to 15 per cent, which also lowers the amount credited to the personal privatization voucher.

What we want are effective owners with an inventive mentality. Society has few such people, just as it has few real inventors. We want such people to get the money.

If the money is apportioned out equally to every member of society, conditions for amassing capital will be optimal, as those who don't want to take to business, will simply sell their share to those willing to handle property.

On the other hand, if the money is simply handed over to employees used to identifying job with property, we can then hardly expect any flow of money from one enterprise to another, which implies a money market. Either there won't be anything of the sort, or this flow will be sluggish. Moscow attempted that, but it was soon seen that it was getting nowhere.

People won't realize that they are owners that soon.

Why, then, is the Russia Unity faction accusing you of a policy of levelling?

What does the opposition really seek? It wants things to go on as before, but the profits netted by industry be reinvested in industry, so that nothing be paid out as di-

It has begun

After much controversy and discussion, the concept of privatization has eventually been evolved. With land and housing resources not envisaged as yet, the programme for this year divides the earmarked objects into five different groups. They are:

- enterprises which may not be privatized, such as mineral wealth, water, air space, cultural heritage and the property of the armed forces. Likewise not liable are enterprises producing radioactive, narcotic and poisonous substances, space vehicles and several other lines;

- enterprises, whose privatization must be sanctioned by the government of the Russian Federation or the respective government of the republic in this federation, include defence plants, enterprises of nuclear power, energy producing and mining industries, commercial banks, communications, publishing and much else;

- enterprises, whose privatization must necessarily be sanctioned by the State

Committee for the Management of State Assets, include, firstly, monopoly enterprises and also the largest enterprises, employing more than 10,000 workers and likewise transportation, colleges and universities and factories manufacturing alcoholic and tobacco products (for three years the indicated Committee may retain the control share holding at the enterprises of this and previous groups);

- forming a separate group are those objects earmarked for privatization that are covered by local programmes, including municipal transit, bath houses, laundries, chemists and so on;

- the fifth group includes objects mandated for privatization and include the trading network, building trusts, enterprises of public catering and the light and food industries, and also unfinished construction projects and projects taking years to complete, as well as enterprises in any branch that operate at a loss.

Modes of privatization envisage auctioning and competitive tendering for smaller enter-



Anatoly Chubais, Russia's chief privatization officer

prises employing less than 200 workers; sharing for larger enterprises employing more than 1,000 workers and with assets priced at more than 50 million rubles. Medium enterprises may be privatized by any of the programme modes, such as sale by competitive tendering, the sale of shares or stock and redemption of the assets of leased enterprises, etc.

Privatization is financed by commercial or foreign banks or from what are known as the funds of the Soviets of People's Deputies. The Central Bank may not participate.

vidends. But the very idea of privatization is to have share owners get dividends, as without that you will not have a market in securities and shares.

In the context of privatization, managers will find themselves in tough straits. As a businessman, for instance, I'll hire a manager to administrate, but if he fails to cope and the enterprise is unprofitable, I'll sack him at once. Since the opposition, for the most part, speaks for people who are averse to market competition, that is, factory managers, it objects to genuine privatization.

What about the people outside of production?

If we concede to the opposition, they won't get anything at all. Thus, if we give a factory to its employees on an instalment plan with only 15 percent deposited at once and the remainder left to drag for years, we won't get a profit for that property. It will become obsolescent and soon we'll have nothing left of it at all.

As matters stand today, people don't realize that much the danger that lurks here, as this approach is advantageous not so much for work collectives, as for nomenclatura.

How quickly will we be able to privatize the appropriately slated enterprises?

We already have laws that permit privatiza-

tion, and that is the basic thing. There are still some gaps left, but we are filling them in so that operating enterprises not be sold outside of the system of competitive tendering. The process itself will take several years to be fully implemented.

Which means people will manage to get and use the vouchers you've been talking about?

Definitely so. Privatization cannot occur overnight. As for demonopolization, we should do that at once, which we are doing, even though the Russian Unity bloc will try to stick a spanner in the works.

The paramount arena of the privatization wrangle in the foreseeable future will be not parliament, but the government, wherein, though in one harness, the "Chicagoan boys" and the "Red directors" look different ways. Which means a lot will depend on which way the tug of war will go, whose side the President will take. So far Yeltsin has not made up his mind. Meanwhile the Russian parliament might not endorse Yegor Gaidar's appointment as Prime Minister.

Konstantin Katanian



Samovars instead of missiles

Now long ago the Tula engineering works Shtamp (Stamp) received an unexpected offer. Formerly, it manufactured ammunition for the Grad rocket systems, just lately, however, it made a switch to almost completely producing goods for civil needs. Foreign companies took an interest in these goods. German and British businessmen



have been particularly attracted by a new product of the Shtamp works — Tula samovars. They have an excellent reputation and are exported to 60 countries, with demand continuing to outstrip supply. German and British businessmen have offered Shtamp to become partners in a joint venture for the manufacture of samovars. It is to be hoped they will not be disappointed. The latest technologies are used by Shtamp in the production of samovars and other household articles, including metal ware, fire-extinguishers capable of putting out the fire of 100 litres of petrol within three seconds, and other goods that measure up to international standards. In particular, Shtamp has mastered an original method of decorative coating which does not only make articles, samovars included, look attractive but also increases their mechanical strength and resistance to corrosion.



From Europe to Singapore

While the government is considering how to restore economic ties on the territory of the

former USSR the recently founded Russian Foreign Trade Company has assumed part of this uphill task. Within a short time this joint-stock company of an open type has accumulated a statutory fund of 500 million rubles. It is actively drawing shareholders from among enterprises. Shares are being bought not only by state-run enterprises but also by enterprises in the alternative economy, private firms included. A rather high cost of shares — 250,000 rubles each — is regarded as a guarantee of the reputation of partners for whom the Russian Foreign Trade Company will provide a complex of export and import services in the marketing of their own goods and the purchasing of necessary goods abroad.

The company is trying not only to unite producers in the dozens of branches of the former USSR but also to gain leading positions on the foreign market. For this purpose it has set up offices in West European countries and Singapore. There are also intentions to open similar offices in North and South America. According to Alexei Sazonov, deputy chairman of the company's board, it is holding promising talks on business cooperation with Fiat, Peugeot, Tokyo Electronics, General Electric and Philips.

The Russian Foreign Trade Company is not going to make money "out of the air," as this is done by numerous mediators in Russia. Its leaders seek to reduce to a minimum the goods traffic from sellers to consumers by becoming a reliable and advantageous mediator in export-import operations.



New partner

The Republic of Azerbaijan agreed to become a founding partner in a joint venture pipeline consortium established last month by the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Sultanate of Oman. The three parties shall have equal interests in the pipeline project.

The pipeline consortium will operate as a limited liability company and will be named Caspian Pipeline Consortium Ltd. The objective of the consortium is the design, finance, construction and operation of a pipeline to transport petroleum from locations in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to the present or future terminals in the Gulf, the Mediterranean or the Black Sea.

According to the agreement, Oman will arrange all project debt financing for the pipeline consortium, while Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan will contribute petroleum resources to provide credit support. In addition, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan will provide rights of way, rights of access and use of the infrastructure, plus the use of existing pipelines and other facilities and tax breaks.

On June 22, Oman's Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals announced that Chevron of the United States had signed, in Muscat, a memorandum of understanding to join the pipeline consortium at a future date. The agreement also outlined Chevron's desire to obtain "priority access" to the pipeline for all crude oil that it plans to produce in the Tengiz and Korolev fields of Kazakhstan, where it entered a joint venture development and production sharing agreement with the newly independent state last May.



Buryatia, a new Eldorado

Officials of the Buryat Republic's Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations have lately noted an enhanced interest of Western businessmen in their region. In the hotels of Buryat towns there are today not just a few businessmen from the West who are attracted first of all by the raw material wealth of that republic.



But while some are only examining Buryatia's mineral resources and sizing up opportunities, others, displaying a business approach, are taking the bull by the horns, so to speak. The German firm Klerimex recently opened its office in the Buryat Republic, thereby demonstrating its serious intentions to do business there. Klerimex general manager H. Neumann said on visiting the republic that the office staff would not be bored. The firm is planning to take part in the exploitation of Buryat deposits of lead and zinc and in the manufacture of drugs from Siberian plants. Mr Neumann said that Klerimex could organize the delivery of foodstuffs to the republic and the additional training of Buryatian specialists in Western Europe.

Ordeals of a North Korean fugitive

In 1967, in the time of Brezhnev, the Soviet Union and its "close ally", the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, concluded an intergovernmental agreement on timber felling in the Khabarovsk Territory. In spite of ups and downs in political relations between the two countries the agreement was continually prolonged. In the spring of last year it was prolonged again, with the parties reaffirming "friendship and good-neighbour relations" between them. This took place against the backdrop of leaflets about annulment of the agreement; they had been distributed among local people in the entire Verkhnebureinsky District, where Chegdomyn, the main settlement on North Korean timber-felling sites, is situated. The former State Committee for the Protection of Nature came out against prolongation of the agreement "because of the catastrophic decline in the number of wild animals in the timber-felling zone." The session of the Soviet of the neighbouring Amur region unanimously voted for ending joint timber-felling. But the protests were ignored. The agreement remains valid.

Experts predict that during the last 25 years the North Koreans have shipped Siberian timber worth seven billion dollars. It remains a top secret what sum has been earned by Russia. Speaking at a meeting of the UN Human Rights Committee, held in Geneva at the end of last February, a Russian delegate admitted that the 22,000 North Koreans employed at timber-felling sites in Siberia are virtually prisoners "whose terrible conditions don't differ in any way from medieval slavery." He also disclosed that "in these camps sentences are handed down by kangaroo courts. Quite innocent people are tortured and killed without investigation or a trial."

Each time Pyongyang angrily refutes such charges. Nevertheless, it was compelled to admit that since the conclusion of the agreement some of the Koreans brought to Siberia have run away. "There are fewer deserters now," says Pavel Grishchenko, former head of the territorial visa and registration office. "In 1974, when I began to work in the office, 50 to 60 people ran away each year. Special agents hunted down these people, caught them and brought them back, even those who had settled down and already had families and children — all without exception."

The fate of Han Chel Gil, who ran away from the North Korean timber-felling sites, is surprising. He managed twice to flee from the public security agents, the North Korean intelligence acting in fact legally, evidently on the entire territory of the former USSR.


A North Korean who refused to return home after working for some time in Russia asserts that the Kim II Sung regime has set up concentration camps here

Here is what Han Chel Gil told our reporter during his short visit to Moscow.

New Times. How did you come to the Siberian timber-felling sites?

Han Chel Gil. On demobilization from the North Korean People's Army in the spring of 1987 I went to the Wonsan port, where my parents lived at the time. Incidentally, our family lived in Pyongyang before. My father had a high rank in the secret service. But he was not lucky. During the Korean war a junior brother of my mother, then a child, was on the territory occupied by American troops in South Korea. And he remained to live there. Shortly before my demobilization the intelligence service found out that my uncle, whom I had never seen, was an officer of the National Army of South Korea. My father was immediately pensioned off and the entire family was exiled to the provincial town of Wonsan. There is a secret law in North Korea: if you are blacklisted you and your family are exiled to a remote place.

On coming to Wonsan I got the job of a film projector operator. Once, at night, I was summoned by the head of the film rental service. "A decision has been made to send you to a timber-felling site in Russia," he said. "Of tomorrow you are no longer our employee. Go to the public security office and they will give you the necessary papers." At first I tried to refuse. After all, I had just returned home after seven years of service in the army. But my chief told me: "If you refuse to fulfil the task of hon-



The plan of Point 1 of North Korea's timber-felling sites in Chegdomyn, drawn by Han Chel Gil

our entrusted to you by the party all the roads will be closed to you in our town." In short, I had no choice.

N.T. What happened then?

H.C.G. Before leaving, all of us, selected to go "on a mission," were summoned at night to the Wonsan public security office. I was asked to sign a paper which said: "While staying on the territory of Soviet Siberia the undersigned must not speak disparagingly of his homeland, the great leader Kim Il Sung and the dear leader Kim Jong Il. In addition, the undersigned must strictly observe Soviet laws and avoid contacts with Soviet Koreans. If such contacts take place, the undersigned must praise in every way the victorious policy of the "Juche" idea and the leadership of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. Thirdly, if the undersigned hears that one of his comrades speaks unfavourably about the "Juche" policy and his leaders, he must urgently report this to his immediate superior. In case the undersigned fails to fulfil any of these rules he shall be punished in keeping with the laws of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea."

On August 16, 1987, we arrived in Khasan, a town on the border with Russia. There we were thoroughly searched by customs officials. However, on the Korean side the check-up was more humiliating: even the genitals were examined. Soviet customs officials told us, smiling, that only dogs are checked in such a manner. Then we boarded the train and went further.

N.T. How many days did you go and what were conditions on the train?

H.C.G. We were driven like cattle for a whole week. The blinds on the car windows were drawn. There were six to eight people in each sleeping compartment. One could go to the WC only with the permission of a security officer — they drove in each car. At some stations the train stood for five to six hours. No one was allowed to go out of the cars. Russian conductors said: "Are you prisoners? If not, then go out to take a breath of fresh air, at least on the boarding platform."

N.T. Where did your travelling ordeal end?

H.C.G. Some of the workers at last got off the train at the Talandzha station. I was also made to get out. Buses were standing near the train. We had to walk to them between two lines of guardsmen who ordered that we should not look around. Near the buses we were lined up and counted. Then we boarded the buses and in two hours we arrived in the Zinovo village, where No.9 timber-felling site was situated. The first site was in Chegdomyn.

On arrival in Zinovo we were led in formation to a building surrounded by barbed wire. It turned out to be the local security service office. A huge portrait of Kim Il Sung, as high as the building, stood in front

of it. On both sides of the portrait hung red streamers with an inscription, "All, down to the last man, to the front of socialist construction." Near the building we were again lined up, and guardsmen began to rummage through our things. Before I left for Siberia, people who had already worked at timber-felling sites advised me to take some special articles as presents for local chiefs. "With the help of costly gifts," friends said, "you can get an easy job."

N.T. Did you follow this advice?

H.C.G. Yes, but first of all — what efficiency! — the local chief showed me the paper I signed in Wonsan. "Do you agree with the points of the statement you have signed?" he asked. When I nodded approvingly, the chief added: "If you violate any point of the signed promise, not only you, but also all your relatives at home will be punished." Then, as friends taught me, I presented him with a good Japanese watch. Taking it without confusion, the chief said that he would take care of me. Indeed, soon I received a "prestigious job". I was appointed the film projector operator of all timber-felling sites. The main advantage of my job was that I was one of the few men who could go outside the camp — to Khabarovsk.

The security officer soon invited me again. Having talked about one thing and after another, he told me confidentially: "Though I hold a high post here, my possibilities are rather limited. I cannot go outside the territory entrusted to me. You have such a possibility. I'll give you some things and you'll sell them on the local flea market. For this service you will retain the job of a film projector operator plus the favour of the chiefs." I told him that his request went against the statement I had signed. "Don't worry," he reassured me. "I'm the boss here. It depends on me whom to punish and to whom to show mercy."

N.T. What was the payment for labour at timber-felling sites?

H.C.G. According to the pay sheet, where I put my signature, I was supposed to have 150 rubles a month. But, in fact, I received 25 rubles. When I asked why I get so little, I was told: "Look, you get much more than others who receive five, ten or twelve rubles, though their work is by far harder than yours. You receive so little because a certain sum is deducted for meals, correspondence with relatives, the reading of newspapers and movie nights. But a great part of your wage goes to the Homeland Fund."

No wonder almost every worker at the timber-felling site is engaged in "business" — the contraband of gold, narcotics and glands of musk deers, a highly valuable ingredient in oriental medicine. Koreans hunt down musk deers day and night. These animals are ruthlessly killed on vast territories.

N.T. What is the timber-felling system like?

An excerpt from a letter of the North Korean Embassy in Moscow to the New Times

The press in Western and other countries is spreading misinformation over the protest made by our workers on March 17, when *Der Spiegel* journalists and persons who accompanied them tried to hold an inquiry into the affairs of the timber industry office of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea in the Russian Federation. The newspapers of these countries even dare spread the demagoguery that the PDRK timber industry office in the Russian Federation emerged as "a result of a secret deal" and is actually "a concentration camp."

It is a brazen action that could be undertaken only by wretched hired scribblers who are prepared to launch attacks and spread insinuations for the sake of a miserable sum of dollars. Having dismissed the mission of the press — to report the truth — they are distorting facts, thereby playing the role of despicable hangers-on following those who intend to undermine the dignity and prestige of the PDRK and to drive a wedge into the relations of friendship and cooperation between the PDRK and the Russian Federation.

The provocateurs must admit their guilt and apologize.

H.C.G. The timber-felling areas occupy a vast territory with a diameter of 300 km. The workers are divided into companies, with 150 men in each. A company is divided into squads, each consisting of seven men. They have their own chief, a guardsman. Loggers live in makeshift houses which look like pigsties. They have no windows, and there is always a heavy smell there. In the corner of each room stands a bed roughly constructed from boards. The meals of loggers consist mainly of rice, which they grow themselves. The working day lasts 14 to 15 hours. There is not a single woman on felling sites. During the three years of the "mission" many young workers become either homosexual or impotent.

Control over people is exercised with the help of total surveillance. All workers are divided into groups of four, and each has its informant. So whatever you do becomes well known to the chiefs in Chegdomyn, where the main prison of the timber-felling sites is situated.

N.T. How do you know that?

H.C.G. I was imprisoned several times. The first time I was put in it for only three days. The Khabarovsk police once arrested me for speculation. I tried to sell the things of my superior. As usual, the Soviet police handed me to my "benefactor," and the latter sent me to prison because I "lost" his things.


There are only five cells in the prison. The first two are intended for the "small fry," those who were caught by the police while doing "business." As a rule, they are not tortured and are quickly set free. "Trouble-makers," those who quarrelled with their superiors for some reason, are kept in the three other cells. They are beaten and tortured in a special chamber. At first glance, it looks like a small gymnasium. In the corner lies massive bludgeons and thick ropes hang from the ceiling. Those who get into the prison for the third time are given short shrift. They are taken to the taiga and executed there.

N.T. How do the local authorities react to all these practices?

H.C.G. Relations between the local police and the North Korean authorities have always been very good. In Zinovo, where I worked at first, there was a Soviet captain who spent all his time in our security office. Once I asked him: "Do you serve in the Soviet or North Korean police?" "It's all the same for me where I serve," he replied. "The USSR and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea are two fraternal socialist countries. We are working for the common cause."

N.T. Why did you decide to run away if the term of your stay at the timber-felling sites was to expire soon?

H.C.G. In August 1988 my good friend was about to return home. Thanks to "business" I had bought some things: a fridge, a TV set, and a motorcycle which I bought from a local resident for two boxes of vodka. I dispatched all these things home together with my friend. I waited for a reply from my parents, but there was no word from them. Finally, in February 1989, I received in a roundabout way a letter from my father's friend who worked in the security service. The letter said that, having received the things, the father held a party with close friends. Drinking wine a little, my father complained that he had worked in the security system for 40 years but could not save money even for a fridge while his son, who went away in search of a living to another country, was able to build such wealth during a year. The next day my father was arrested. It is rumoured that he was executed. The mother, brother and sister were sent to "a re-education camp" as relatives of a "traitor to the homeland." My



Going to work in Siberia, all Korean workers signed a promise of loyalty to the great leader Kim Il Sung, his son and dear leader Kim Jong Il, as well as to the "Juche" idea

Photo from Newsweek (USA)

father's friend ended his letter with a warning: "Your fate has been predetermined. You will soon be called back home in order to be sent to a camp too."

N.T. How could you run away so easily?

H.C.G. At first I had good luck. I slipped through special guards in Chegdomyn. I also succeeded in getting through the Soviet police cordon set for catching fugitives at one of the stations on the Trans-Siberian railway.

For some time I hid in the homes of local Koreans in Birobidjan. Then, having got fake documents, they sent me to Tashkent and then to Ukraine — to the town of Sadovsky, near Zhitomir. During the summer of 1990 I worked on lease. I saved money and ventured to get to the port of Nakhodka, where, according to rumours, a used Japanese car could be bought. On October 20, at the Khabarovsk railway station, I was suddenly attacked by security agents. I resisted as much as I could and shouted. The police intervened in the conflict, and I was taken to the local police office. But

a day later I was "stolen" by my compatriots and sent to the prison in Chegdomyn. For a week I was beaten unmercifully. I was closely cropped like a criminal, and they prepared to take me to Korea. But right at the plane's ladder the local police tore me away from the hands of security agents.

Later I wrote a letter to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, asking it to grant political asylum to me. The former Union parliament turned down my request. Nevertheless, I was given a residence permit.

N.T. Did the North Korean secret police stop searching for you after that?

H.C.G. On the contrary, they began to hunt after me with redoubled energy.

After the Khabarovsk incident I again went to the town of Sadovsky. I felt that "my home" was there. One day, in the spring of 1992, I went to a shop. Near the shop "sturdy guys" began to beat me. I regained consciousness in a hospital. A local doctor told me that I was lucky because people usually die after such blows.

The local police caught the criminals. One of them, Sasha by name, admitted that in Khabarovsk he got acquainted with some Korean who gave him money and my address in Sadovsky and ordered him to

"kill a traitor." Sasha was promised a large fee after a successful completion of the operation.

On returning home from the hospital I discovered that someone had ransacked my flat: things were scattered and pieces of furniture were knocked around. However, nothing was stolen. On the table I saw a note saying "Greetings from Chegdomyn." Later I understood that the thieves looked for my residence permit. They could steal me more easily if it was destroyed. But, luckily, at that moment the permit was in the local police office.

N.T. What are your plans?

H.C.G. I no longer have anything to conceal and nothing to be afraid of. I'm at my wits end. I have only one desire: to go away from here as soon as possible, because I understood there is no refuge for me in Russia. The present situation in your country is characterized by lawlessness. In this atmosphere it is very easy to make short shrift of a man objectionable to anyone.

Interviewer:
Alexander Chudodoyev

They don't steal in Kuopio

You can leave your purse in a shop and drop in to collect it in a year. This is of course unless anyone from the former USSR drops by before you

They parked the car and entered the shop. They took a look at the furniture, opened the doors of a polished wardrobe, tested the sofa to see if it was springy enough, sat in armchairs. Neither of the shop attendants paid any attention to them, and then Helen said: "I would like to buy a microwave oven. Would you please tell me, which one is the best?"

The attendants started their explanations. In the meantime Erich inspected stereo systems on the shelves, then tape-recorders, refrigerators, washing machines, finally returning back to electronics. He then left the shop. Helen joined him near the car, when he was putting a long black tape-recorder on the back seat.

Former residents of Tallinn, Erich B. and Helen L., were neighbours of a couple from St. Petersburg, Sergei and Helen P., in a five-storey apartment house on the outskirts of Kuopio, the capital of the Savo province in Finland. Apart from them, there were many other emigrants from the USSR there, all expecting the status of refugees. The government of Finland issued each of them food supplies, a room and one and a half thousand markkas a month — a regular though a rather modest income considering the high prices in the country.

They were stopped by a policeman near the door:

"Mister B.? I have a warrant to search your room. Open the door."

The police did a brisk job. Brand-new tape-recorders, leather jackets, video systems and sheepskin coats were found under the sofa and in the wardrobe...

...Erich B. had been an electrician in Tallinn, Sergei P. had been a cook in St. Petersburg. Both came to Finland quite legally by tourist visas, as had their female co-travellers. They didn't spend a long time in Helsinki where there were more than enough Soviet tourists. Shop attendants in Helsinki are especially watch-

ful when "Soviets" pay them visits, more akin to raids.

B. and P., one with his wife and the other with a girl-friend, requested political refuge in Finland. They knew that the Finnish government was most considerate to any request of refuge and provides, albeit for a time, tolerable housing conditions for every applicant. Having joined hands with a young Estonian who had decided against his tour of duty in the army and fled abroad, they started a "firm" specializing in shoplifting in provincial cities. Stolen things were smuggled to Estonia and sold at a nice profit.

The "firm" was launched in the spring of 1991, and by summer it began to prosper. The mechanics of stealing were very simple: the women distracted the personnel's attention while the men picked up whatever they liked. The stolen things were kept in caches of their Kuopio apartment before being sent to Estonia. It's impossible to find out now what and how much was smuggled into Estonia in this way. At any rate, during the search, two minibuses full of unpaid-for goods from ritzy shops were found, costing more than FM 100 000, even with sea-

sonal reductions taken into account. The commercial exchange rate of one markka varies between 25 and 27 rubles in Estonia.

The court investigated each episode in depth, and the deeper the hearings were, the more questions arose. For instance, how did the rogues manage to take the things out of the shop? In Western countries all goods are encoded, and if a customer hasn't paid for them, an alarm will be sounded when he goes out of the door. However, it's not for nothing that Erich B. worked as an electrician — he had a muffling contrivance, so he could carry out goods undisturbed and even openly examined them while his inquisitive fiancée was asking the shop attendants questions...

At the trial both defendants insisted that all goods taken away during the search had been bought by them with their own money, and that even if they had stolen anything, it was not from the state but from the Estonian mafia.

They were not readily believed. In the meantime, a car with a Finnish license plate drove to the apartment house. Several Estonians came out and, the targetted tenants not being at home, severely beat their neighbour. Other neighbours, disturbed by the noise, called the police. The invaders, however, managed to escape.

The court was rather lenient because of the impossibility of proving the defendants' guilt in some episodes — although the two main heroes were sentenced to imprisonment, their ladies were only put on probation or made to pay a fine. In addition, an accomplice in dodging military service will have to shell out a thousand markkas. It goes without saying that all of them will be kicked out of Finland and barred from the country for all eternity.

...Kuopio is a beautiful and quiet city. It's a city of scholars and students, tradesmen and students, loggers and yachtsmen, and, as anywhere in Finland, of skiers and hockey players. The people here have always been sympathetic towards Soviet people. Now the Soviet Union is no more, but cargo ships from Russia and Baltic states still visit the port. Recently they have been received without much enthusiasm. They joke with melancholy:

"They don't steal in Kuopio. You may leave your purse full of money in a shop or in a café and drop in a year to find it intact. If, of course, a person from the USSR doesn't arrive before you..."

Mark Levin

Drawing by Marat Tairov

KUOPIO—HELSINKI—TALLINN

NEW TIMES
INTERNATIONAL

The young lady and the novelist



Soviet reality has produced a male type, whose eyes say like those of the erstwhile bread-and-butter miss: "Anything but that!"

Literary reviewing and criticism has always been primarily a male occupation, evidently because the man trusts mind more than heart. A man sees a book and understands that it is a book. When it is a novel, the male critic will review it accordingly. When the title page names the author as Yuri Bondarev, that means he is dealing with a well-known author, who has won prizes and has been decorated with orders. I, sadly enough, though not for lack of trying, have never been able to produce a single essay or review about this author's oeuvre.

Brainy, intellectual, sad, patriotic, elderly, a writer, film-maker, painter or architect (underline wherever necessary), whose colleagues do not understand him, who is married to a worthy, true, understanding, patriotic, but unfortunately elderly lady, and who is afflicted not with the seven-year, but with the seventy-year itch. A lovely, long-legged, fashionably garbed, modern, sensitive, sexy, uninhibited young lady prepared to be patriotic and head over heels in love, acts as helper secretary, or housekeeper (underline where necessary) and looks admiringly at the central character. However, he, though uplifting her mind, imparting patriotic fervor and caressing her, fails to bed her, firstly because he simply cannot be unfaithful to his wife and secondly, because he is reluctant to wreck the young lady's life. What an unhappy end.

In the above paragraph I have encapsulated the plot of several novels which Bondarev produced in recent decades. Yes, the plot of several novels. So what if a man pens novels revolving around one plot. Male critics review each novel individually, some with bouquets, others with brickbats. I can only bitterly envy them. Because I feel that if in that first "romance" the hero had let the girl undress — which she very much wanted to do and which he too wanted her to do — hardly would that have escaped the eyes of the loving, sensitive spouse and matters would have gone no further

than that one "affair," or "romance".

The feeling that book and life are one, that the author lives as he writes, obstructs my female intuition from properly analyzing not only the epics our Soviet classic has produced, but even his essays. Thus, in his recent *Sovetskaya Rossiya* contribution, entitled "The Traders in the Temple," he observes that "the sexual revolution has failed to bring joy."

That may have escaped the male eye, the more so, as the essay is crammed with much prettier sentiments. However, this seemingly simple observation brought up a fullstop. It made me think that this poor soul should years ago, yet in that remote first "romance" either not have hugged the young girl on the edge of the bed, or if so, should have at least unknotted his tie. What joy otherwise? Only anguish and torment.

My frivolous female mind leads me still further, preventing me from fathoming the full depth of Bondarev's publicistic essays. After all, even before that sexual revolution there had always been the simpering bread-and-butter miss, whose eyes ever said: "Anything but that!" However, I had never heard of a male type of that order.

A word once said evokes another. An act once performed evokes another act. In other words, a role thus chosen entails donning the appropriate garb. Some who read Bondarev's articles see him as a leader of the conservative Right-wing, who detest freedom and regard each democrat as a personal enemy. So we find in his article: "The repugnant altars of invented deities from Gorbachev to Alexander Yakovlev, from Shevardnadze to Yegor Gaidar." Plus even the following gem: "Bondage for the individual is not so frightening." I suppose every Russian writer from the very beginnings of Russian literature would turn over in his sainted coffin to hear this Soviet classic say that thing, as having always stressed that nothing's more precious than the individual and have preached in the wake of Jesus Christ that nothing is more

frightening than bondage for the individual.

Some take Bondarev as addicted with a morbidly vulnerable love of self so greatly vulnerable that he is no longer able to see life in a rational perspective. Indeed, Bondarev's writings have long been gathering dust. True, years ago he was the one-eyed man in the country of the blind. Not so today, which he finds it hard to believe. No wonder in this contribution he again lambasts writers, noting: "More and more spiritual dregs rally to the flag of the avant-garde," "amorous Goethic gutter novels," "plastic characters," and "nymphomaniac thirteen-year-old mistresses," apparently with respect to Nabokov?

However, for me, once I felt Bondarev to be a bread-and-butter miss, that is what I have long taken him to be. Incoherent confused word combinations ("Themis-judge of the people," "the façade of our art is mucked up by obscene symbols of barbarians," "the screeching in the orgiastic madness of the press"), hollow circumlocutions ("an incursion of rodents repugnantly rustling papers"), and intimation of some secret, exact knowledge (it appears that our country has now been "hurled" forty years back: in what respect is life nowadays for this writer and essayist like that of 1952?)

As I remember, this type of bread-and-butter miss was magnificently characterized by the unforgettable Pigasov, the central character of Turgenev's novel "Rudin." "All simpering misses generally are supremely unnatural, especially when conveying feeling," Pigasov said that whenever such a young lady took fright or felt sad, she would "inevitably impart some exquisite bend to her body." Upon which he would contort his body in an ugly gargoyle.

Note that Pigasov secured a genuinely true expression of feeling from one remarkably unnatural miss when "poking her side from behind with an aspen stake." He was coarse and rude, and most likely told fibs. Still I can understand what motivated him. After all, now and again one indeed wants to know what the unnatural simpering bread-and-butter miss really feels.

Tatiana Ivanova



Sergei Korovin, a former first-aid doctor, is the man who organized the Red Square international gala event of music and dance, the first of its kind in Russia's history, which included world famous pop stars.

Seven years ago Sergei gave up his medical career, saying he didn't like the idea of giving second-rate treatment due to the conditions which he had no control over. He formed a cooperative, Orion, consisting initially of three men who took care of the technical (sound and light) end of putting on concerts. Over a period of time, the outfit began to provide these kinds of services for world renown festivals, worked in East European countries, and organized trade in costly musical instruments and accessories. The cooperative, now called Orion Service Co, presently participates only in large-scale shows.

The idea of holding an international music festival in Moscow has been entertained for a long time. Similar events have become a tradition in the West. Orion Service Co undertook, without a sponsor, to prepare a grand show, devoting it to the democratic revival of Russia. Korovin managed to persuade the Russian government as well as local Moscow officials to allow music in the Red Square. Such variety stars as Alla Pugacheva, Valery Leontiev and Alexander Serov responded to the invitation. They gave up planned concert tours and recordings. Patricia Kaas agreed to perform in Moscow free of charge.

Sergei's family has got used to

his constant absence from home. He has had no days off including holidays for five years now. At present, he is again busy organizing a gala concert programme. But its venue and date will be kept secret for some time.

Prof. **Vasily Abayev** has many titles. He is a doctor of philology, holder of the state prize of Russia and the Khetagurov prize of North Ossetia, honourable member of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, corresponding member of the Finno-Ugor Society in Helsinki, honoured scientist of Georgia and North Ossetia. He earned these titles by his contributions to science.

Vasily Abayev played a major



part in awakening the Ossetians' interest in their cultural legacy. His work in the field of Asian studies are known far outside his native country. One of the eminent French scientists, Georges Dumézil, who studied the history and culture of the Caucasus nationalities, wrote in 1976: "In Moscow, research work

is led by a highly cultured Ossetian, V.I. Abayev (Abaity Vasso), a linguist, historian and ethnographer, the author of numerous articles and several books of key importance."

In the opinion of Abayev, creative freedom and the constant striving for the objective truth are important for a scientist. There is no room for national ambitions in science. Strictly following this principle, he noted: "If the nationality of a scientist dictates his scientific positions and decisions, it is not science. Such science can be rejected as subjective writing of no scientific importance."

Abayev's works are characterized by strict adherence to scientific principles, lively thought, a well-tuned feeling for style, and by the poetic character and clarity of

Professor of public opinion

"The information we produce is practically not wanted by anyone," says Prof. **Borish Grushin**, head of Vox populi. Russia's first privately-run independent service for the study of public opinion.


A philosopher, journalist and one of the founders of Soviet sociology, Boris Grushin worked as a journalist for a long time. On joining the staff of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, he set up the country's first Institute of Public Opinion. It was 1960, and such an institute could naturally not exist for a long time. It was closed down in 1967. The next initiative of the professor — the Centre for the Study of Public Opinion under the Academy of Sciences — lasted for two years, from 1970 to 1972. At that time public opinion did not interest anyone. Moreover, it was dangerous because it undermined the existing regime.

In May 1989, Grushin founded the Vox populi (VP) service which became private two years later. The credo of the service is genuine professionalism and a high quality of "produce."

Boris Grushin conducts opinion polls on political, cultural, economic and ecological issues. The VP information is used by many periodicals and television programmes. *New Times* is also a constant client of the service. Vox populi held 72 opinion polls last year and 52 in the first half of this year. However, it has become increasingly difficult to sell information.

"The mushrooming political parties in our country have never taken the trouble to find out what the people think about them," Boris Grushin says. "One can only envy such arrogant confidence. Entrepreneurs are not in a hurry to make orders. In the prevailing situation they grow rich without any information. All of them have yet to realize that the present state of affairs will not last long."

Nonetheless Prof. Grushin, with his inexhaustible optimism, sets his hopes on the new generation of businessmen and politicians who will build a new society with the help of full unbiased information.



his writing. He is against the deliberate complication of simple truths as happens when pseudo-scientific arguments are used to conceal the lack of substantive thought. He constantly draws the attention of his followers to this circumstance. Vasily Abayev has become head of the Ossetian school of the humanities. Even the scientists of other nationalities, who learn his methods of investigating complex problems, regard themselves as pupils of the famous professor.

"Moral revival is most important for all of us today," Vasily Abayev says. "A good society in the economic, social and political sense can be built only on good, morally high human material. I think every man can create around himself a sort of magnet field of kindness, humaneness and goodwill towards others."

The scientist himself belongs to people of this kind.

This talented and original artist creates his works in several genres — Marine tales, Flowers, Parallel worlds and Arlecchinos. The splendour of colours in an unusual bunch of flowers or a transparent elf flying over an ordinary city, a woman of dreams and a temperamental musician. Looking at **Igor Rebrov's** pictures you get the feeling that at some time in the past, in sleep and dream, you already visited this strange and wonderful world. On some canvases you can recognize corners of Moscow, Vilnius, Lvov or Prague, where its residents live their life understood only by the artist.

Rebrov's pictures are filled with joy. Even dark colours do not create an atmosphere of melancholy. It is apparently for this reason that you have the desire to leave for yourself a tiny piece of this stirring world.



Igor's works can be found in galleries and private collections in the

United States, Canada, France, Britain, Germany, Italy and other countries. He is also known to the Moscow art lovers. Some time ago six of his works went to the exhibition devoted to the 500th anniversary of the discovery of America, "Christopher Columbus—92. The ship and the sea." Rebrov's marine paintings create an atmosphere of something unique, live and charming, which is difficult to express in words. You can fly away in dreams looking at the ships and

mysterious islands shown in his pictures.

In Russia today even the most talented artist finds it hard to make his way alone. The recently founded centre of painting and applied arts, R-art, helped Rebrov solve his organizational and financial problems. Thanks to it he can invite guests and cooperate with galleries and exhibition halls. It is important for any artist to be able to trace the fate of his canvases.

In the forefront of struggle for democracy

Dr. **Michael McFaul** is under 30. He is full of energy and ideas and makes contact with people easily. Michael did not have serious problems in adapting himself to the realities of Russia. He came to know our country long ago. A graduate of Leningrad University and the Moscow Institute of the Russian Language, he does not have problems in communicating with people here. Till his arrival in Russia Michael McFaul worked at Stanford University, where he was awarded a doctor's degree. He specializes in the field of politics and democratization.

Not long ago Michael McFaul was appointed head of the Russian office of the Democratic Party of the United States or, more exactly, the chief representative of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), a special division of the Democratic Party. Its aim is to promote democratic processes and pluralistic values in new, emergent democracies. Incidentally, the NDI is headed by Walter F. Mondale, a prominent member of the Democratic Party and former vice-president of the United States.

"Our Institute was founded in 1983", Michael McFaul says. "At that time it was simply impossible to imagine that we would work in Moscow. But the world has changed tremendously since then. NDI offices as a component part of the Democratic Party have already been opened in Tashkent and Kiev. The Russian office is the largest."

The activity of the National Democratic Institute is based mainly on the traditions and knowledge worked out by the Democratic Party of the United States, but it is not confined to them. In many countries the NDI cooperates with a broad spectrum of political democratically-oriented forces which understand that society and its economy develop most successfully when citizens can take part in the decision-making process.

"In the 1980s," Michael McFaul says further, "our Institute was in the forefront of the dramatic world transition to democracy. Accepting the challenge of the 1990s, we now better understand the dynamics of democratization and have broader professional contacts and a more thought-out concept of democratic development. Our task is to make use of all this for the establishment of a more free and stable world, and this is the supreme goal of the United States."



Who will break the seventh seal?

The archives are immune to the winds of change...

"And I saw in the right hand, of Him that sat on the throne a book written within and on the backside, sealed with seven seals... And no man in heaven, nor in earth, neither under the earth, was able to open the book, neither to look thereon."
(The Revelation of John Christ)

The Russian archives have long remained such a book sealed with seven seals. It is only now that the curtain is beginning to rise. It looks, though, as if only the first seal has been broken on the book of Russia's historical secrets.

The sun of the dead

Previously a rank-and-file researcher, moreover not a Party member, was barred entry to the echoing vaults of the Central Party Archives (now re-named the Russian Centre for the Safekeeping and Study of the Contemporary History Documents), let alone to the Central Archives of the KGB. Even less exclusive archives opened their doors only to those who carried special permissions to use them. The permissions were issued by, to use the high-falutin' style of the stagnation times, "organizations competent in the subject matter of the relevant line of research." If you were in somebody's bad books, the somebody could always turn you down on the grounds that your organization was not quite competent.

Today it is much easier to find one's way into the archives. Permissions to use them are now often issued to private individuals, not necessarily to those who need access to the archives in the line of duty. Now you can do your own research jobs there. This is certainly an achievement. On the whole, however, the archives remain a dead zone. I can see at least three reasons for that.

The first reason is obvious. In the "mirror-image" socialist world the archives were "the sun of the dead," as it were. They were meant to conceal the truth, above all, not to reveal it. This abnormal situation lasted for so long that even professional archivists, let alone their clients, often lost their way in their own archives. They were not supposed to know what their repositories contained, and the more curious ones were punished for their nosiness. This is why expert guides to our archives are so few and far between. So the researchers eager to unravel the mysteries of this world are in for Sisyphean labour, if not for disappointment.

They will come against an extremely confused and fragmentary system of Russian

archives (particularly the central ones). I envy American and German archivists. Their archives are real Gothic beauties. There is the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, and there are provincial and city archives, plus non-state archives, i.e., those of political parties, universities and private companies. This is the case in the rest of the civilized world. In Russia, archives were divided into historical periods (pre- and post-revolutionary), into spheres of activity (the national economy, the art of warfare, culture), etc.

This is only half the trouble. There have existed, and still exist, many institutions functioning as state repositories of documents: the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defence, the former ministries of mechanical engineering, specialized state archives (geological, cartographical, and others). Before August 1991, the KGB of the USSR had a pride of place on that list, of course. It is not easy to find one's way through this labyrinth even with the help of the latest reference books.

Another trouble with our archives is that they are scattered over too many repositories. This is partly a result of deliberate political calculation, partly ordinary sloppiness. Mostly the former, perhaps. At any rate, it was certainly for ideological reasons only that the Moscow and Petro-

grad archives of the history of the revolution were set up in 1918. As a result the 19th-century police files were divided, with those of the Interior Ministry concentrated in the Central State Historical Archives (re-named this June the Russian State Historical Archives), and those of the Police Department, in the Central State Archives of the October Revolution.

The history of the Soviet epoch's "Ministry of Love" is certainly worth dwelling upon. The records of the GULAG (covering the period of up to the early fifties) have found themselves in the Central State Archives of the October Revolution; of the POW and DP Department, in the Special Archive; and the documents of other such institutions have been divided, in unequal proportions between the Central Archives of the former KGB of the USSR and Russia's Interior Ministry. Desperate attempts are now being made to put the fragments of what used to be a single whole together again. One of those attempts consisted in the transfer of "police" archives from Moscow to Petersburg. This, however, is a drop in the ocean of scattered and stray documents.

There is no law, consequently...

Any researcher dreams of getting an access to the inner reference system of the archives



Drawing by Arkady Gursky

(service catalogues, subject indices, reviews, synopses, index cards). This dream is hardly likely to ever come true, it is a pie in the sky.

Another stumbling block is the veil of secrecy still drawn over separate documents or whole files. Declassification began in state archives in 1987. It went slowly because archivists waited for a go-ahead from the institutions where the appropriate documents had been drawn up. Those institutions were not in a hurry. They were even less in a hurry in the elite archives — the Central Archive of the KGB of the USSR, the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Policy Archive of the USSR.

Following the promulgation early this year of the Pretesident's decree that state secrets be guarded more closely, this work actually came to a stop, on the nauseatingly primitive grounds of there being no official secrets act. On June 23, the Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution which set the minimum "secrecy period" at thirty years. This is a half-measure, too.

The second group of reasons is of a subjective nature. If an archive is busy — on its own or in cooperation with some other organization — carrying out a publishing project, it certainly wants no outside Schliemanns. Or, as the case may be, the given archive may have long-standing ties with a name researcher who would rather do without competitors. Such cases abound. All kind of tricks are used. As V. Rybin, Director of the Military Historical Archives, put it in the lobby of the Archivist Associations' Society, "If we are supposed to keep something back, we shall".

Finally, the "reticence" of the archives is largely due to the inadequacy of their service facilities. Working with dim microfilms in the reading room of the Central State Archives of the October Revolution, for example, takes robust health, which God alone can endow upon one. The efficiency of the microfilming and copying facilities of special laboratories and of state archives is extremely low. Therefore, although the agreement between the Russian Archives Committee and the US Chadwyck-Healey company providing for the sale of the copies of a large number of documents, is far from irreproachable, the fact that it will result in building up a stand-by stock of microfilms outweighs all its faults.

We have to pay, but what for?

What's needed now is a real revolution in the archivists' mentality. They must realize that their No. 1 function is to bring the documents they are in charge of into public circulation. The extent to which this function is

discharged should be the yardstick of their efficiency. As it is now, the standard of the archives (its budget, prestige, etc.) depends on the number of documents kept in it. As all know, the most interesting information is to be found in secret papers. If archivists' incomes depend on the number of the documents they make public, the declassification process will certainly be expedited.

The Central Catalogue and the service catalogues of the state archives should, perhaps, be made accessible to all. I suggest that researchers be given a chance, for a small fee, to use service catalogues and registers.

Material interest should not be ignored, of course. Sometimes it takes on exaggerated, even comic, forms — in the Modern Documents Safekeeping Centre, for instance, one is supposed to pay for an access to documents. This is contrary to the practice accepted in the rest of the world. Why not selling publishing rights to anyone wishing to buy them? In other words, the access to documents needed for a researcher's private use should be free of charge, but if he intends to make these documents public, he has to pay a certain sum (or, as the case may be, a penalty if he attempts piracy).

The Russian Archive Committee has drafted the Archives Act of the Russian

Federation which is, unfortunately, far from perfect. Its main defect is that it leaves many complicated legal problems unsolved.

Unfortunately, the bill does not forbid government institutions to set the procedure of using the documents which they hand over to the archives and to restrict access to them. The bill does not provide for appealing against illegal denials of entry to documents and for punishing the officials guilty of that, and for the reparation of losses sustained by private individuals and the state when using the documents. Neither have the archives' obligations to keep banking, tax, medical and other secrets which have to do with human rights been prescribed. The bill offers no answers to the questions of who has the copyright to the documents kept in the archives, and the priority rights to their publication.

Revising the bill and saturating it with many legal niceties is a matter of prime importance, I think. This will go a long way towards making the archives — along with libraries and museums — true centres of culture and sources of the historical truth.

Arkady Chereschnya,
Cand. Sc. (History)

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
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NEW STARS

IN MUSICAL FIRMAMENT

Young pianists, violinists and cellists under 16, if not less, competed at the newly started International Tchaikovsky Competition for Young Musicians which has just ended in Moscow

Many eminent performers have taken a bow at the Grand Hall of the Moscow Conservatoire, where these young musicians competed. In 1958 it was the scene of the First International Tchaikovsky Piano and Violin Competition, at which famous pianist Van Cliburn was a top winner. Every four years this competition produced more constellations of now world celebrated musicians.

The two-year-old Association of Tchaikovsky Competition Stars, of whom eminent Russian and foreign musicians are members, sponsored this latest event. The jury panels, comprising Russian and foreign Association members, were led by cellist Natalia Shakhovskaya, violinist Irina Bochkova, and pianist Mikhail Pletnev, today artistic director and conductor of the Russian National Symphony Orchestra.

Note that before, when the state patronized youthful musicians in hopes of international triumphs, it would have been more or less simple to arrange such a competition. No wonder Association Vice-President Natalia Shakhovskaya, laureate of the Second Tchaikovsky Competition, so happily reminisced about the wonderful conditions they enjoyed. "We," she related, "were accommodated in Serebryanny Bor on the banks of the Moskva River. Top professors from the Conservatoire such as Rostropovich came to instruct us. We not only rehearsed but also had fun, with some even playing soccer, which Rostropovich refereed. Most foreign entrants envied us as they had to work hard for two or three years to earn the money needed. Incidentally afterwards many countries followed our example. However nowadays the traditional system of state patronized culture, good or bad, has been destroyed and nothing introduced in its place. No wonder performers especially beginners are mate-

rially and morally hard up. Every young musician has to find hard currency on his own hook to enter a competition abroad. This, let alone the need to repair an instrument or buy a new one, even mend a bow, is done only for hard currency."

Hence Association President Lev Vla-



senko and other executives, especially General Director Andrei Shcherbak had to slave away to recruit sponsors and hold a competition, in which young musicians from 18 countries participated. The International Hi-Tech & Information Technologies Exchange, of which Andrei Shmakov is president, and Kohan Craig's Moscow office of the US Coca-Cola firm undertook to sponsor the competition, which has tentatively cost them 7 million rubles.

The fact that many competitions for teenagers are held throughout the world is not

surprising, as nowadays, says Mikhail Pletnev, "many children perform better and more fascinatingly than grownups." Natalia Shakhovskaya echoed his sentiments noting: "Both here and abroad there are as far as I know a vast number of 10-11 year-old superb musicians who display an almost impeccable technique and a mature artistry."

Truth to tell, this First International Tchaikovsky Competition for Young Musicians offered a graphic demonstration with the grand prizes of figures of Cupid sculpted by Boris Svinin of St. Petersburg awarded to violinist Jennifer Koh from the USA, cellist Daniel Müller-Schott from Germany, and the two pianists Emily Hsieh, again from the USA, and Alexander Mogilevsky of Russia. Incidentally, as only three figures had been made, they were presented to the foreign prize-winners at the closing ceremony, with Alexander Mogilevsky thus having to wait before he gets his prize.

Though I frequent Conservatoire Grand Hall recitals, which practically always draw packed houses, I cannot remember such enthusiastic uplift as was to be observed at the final recitals. Performance by winners of the first and second prizes were "super." Again as during the third round young violinists and cellists were brilliantly accompanied by the Grand Symphony Orchestra of the Ostankino Television and Broadcasting Company, while the young pianists were accompanied by the Russian National Symphony Orchestra.

I can definitely say that this competition produced a whole galaxy of coming stars. No wonder, the Association, Andrei Shcherbak told me, has already received many fascinating propositions with the young prize winners invited to give recitals and participate in other competitions. Obviously their brilliance in Moscow will be an unforgettable highlight for them.

This new Tchaikovsky competition will, unlike the one for adult musicians, be held annually but in different countries, only every four years once again in Moscow. The next one is to take place in the USA.

"As I see it, Americans will be flattered to host a competition named after the great Russian composer," said jury panel member and pianist Galina Vracheva of Switzerland and Germany. "After all the music traditions of Russia, whatever the ordeal she is currently going through, well compare to British parliamentary traditions. In short, they are intransigent."

Albert Pin



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MOSCOW- CHICAGO- MOSCOW

For detailed information about the flights contact Aeroflot agencies abroad and in the CIS, or phone: 3128192350 (the Aeroflot Agency in Chicago); 156-80-19 (the Aeroflot Inquiry Office in Moscow).

